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What role do domestic audiences play in authoritarian policy making? This study examines the 
relationship between newspapers and assertive foreign policy. Specifically, this study conducts a 
content analysis of state-published newspapers during periods of unprecedented assertiveness in 
the South China Sea. Borrowing from Galtung’s theory of peace journalism, this study analyzes 
valence patterns used in 99 separate articles published in Xinhua, China Daily, People’s Daily, 
and Global Times. Additionally, this study examines the visibility of these articles, to better 
understand their prominence in national coverage. This study discusses nationalism in the case of 
China, as well as the overwhelming control that its government exerts over domestic access to 
information. However, the applicability of this study extends to any authoritarian state, 
inherently having significant influence on information availability of its domestic audience. 
Finally, this study concludes with a discussion on how these tactics fit in to larger strategic 
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Chapter 1: Information Access and 
Authoritarian States 
How do authoritarian states attempt to control domestic access to information regarding 
foreign policy? Particularly intriguing is how states manipulate history, patriotism, and 
interpretations of world events. This thesis examines how decision making is affected and 
supported by nationalism, by employing a case study of the People’s Republic of China. 
Authoritarian regimes generally use information control to curb alternative information and 
dissent perceived as a power to their rule (Michaelson, 2018). Regimes have historically used 
digital technologies to shape public opinion, mobilize supporters, and track emerging grievances; 
all to update legitimation strategies and administrative performance (Goebel, 2013; Gunitsky, 
2015; MacKinnon, 2011; Morozov, 2011). Specifically, this research explores Beijing’s framing 
of foreign policy in the South China Sea (SCS).  
The relationship between domestic support and foreign policy in authoritarian states is 
already generally accepted in literature (Friedberg, 2015; Swaine, 2010; Zhao, 1997). Accepting 
this premise, this thesis examines how domestic support is crafted by governments. If a state can 
manipulate the domestic audience in a way that unites opinions at a deeper level, it will 
experience much less opposition to assertive foreign policies. The purpose of this research is to 
examine Beijing’s portrayal of its interests in the SCS to its domestic audience, as well as the 
nationalist rhetoric created in order to increase support for foreign policy. China asserts that it 
holds the rights to all of the waters in the SCS, an area disputed with multiple neighboring states. 
Since 2009, Beijing has shown increased assertiveness in maintaining this claim through force. 
Multiple scholars (Fitzgerald, 1999; Gries, 2004; Johnston, 2013; Friedberg, 2015; Turcsanyi, 





relationship between domestic access to information and foreign policy, this thesis will also 
serve to address their claims. 
Security Dilemma 
 Traditional ideals of realism highlight the relevancy of collective emotions as a source of 
nationalistic power (Morgenthau, 1978, 122-6, 168). Morgenthau (1978) introduced the theory of 
political realism, a highly contested view of states’ relationships, after the atrocities the world 
saw with the two world wars. This perspective was particularly popular and largely supported at 
that time, because of the helplessness that was widely felt by survivors of the wars. Political 
realism removes aspects of legality and morality in international politics (14). Much later, 
opposing theories including liberal institutionalism, critical theory, and constructionism were 
presented. This research examines the conditions that political realism sets for how nation states 
interact with each other, and how [external] political realism is realized through [internal] 
information control.    
There is also a distinction to be made between offensive and defensive realism. Taliaferro 
(2000) offers that defensive realism provides incentives for expansion only under certain 
circumstances. Based largely on the calculations of competing states’ future intentions, a states’ 
means to increase security decrease the security of others (129). Because of this greater variation 
in international expansion, under defensive realism, states ought to pursue moderate strategies as 
the best route to security. These two explanations are inherently contradictory visions of the 
security dilemma: offensive realism asserts that a security dilemma always generates intense 
conflict, while defensive does not. Therefore, according to offensive realism, a state ought to 





 Neorealism and neoclassical realism are other variants of the realism model. Each explain 
phenomena that the other does not, but are complimentary to each other. Neorealism seek to 
explain international outcomes—the interaction of 2 or more actors. Also referred to as the 
balance-of-power theory (Waltz, 1979, p. 73), neorealism tells us what pressures are exerted and 
what possibilities are posed by systems of different structure. Neoclassical realism, on the other 
hand, serves to explain why states pursue particular strategies in the international arena 
(Taliaferro, 2000, 133). Prominent advocates of neoclassical realism assert that “the impact of 
material capabilities sets the parameters of its foreign policy” (134). In other words, the potential 
of a states’ affects is directly related to the way a state makes foreign policy decisions. Lobell 
(2009) points out that for neoclassical realists, the state is an intervening variable between the 
international system and foreign policy (44). This variant of realism contradicts Mearsheimer’s 
(2001) argument that “national wealth, population, and the manpower of armies of regional and 
potential regional hegemons” are directly linked to foreign policy behavior. However, 
neoclassical realism retains Morgenthau’s original essence of realism, while capturing the 
domestic factors that influence China’s decision-making.  
Organski (1989) describes the essence of the neoclassical argument: the power transition 
theory. This model is a version of the realist perspective, however, is fundamentally different in 
its assumptions. Namely, “power transition sees the international order not as anarchical at all, 
but as hierarchically organized in a manner similar to the domestic political system. Actors 
accept their position in the international order and recognize influence based on differences in 
the power distribution among nations. This fundamentally different assumption separates power 
transition from preceding realist models.” (Organski and Kugler, 1989, p. 172). Power transition 





the dissatisfied party anticipates greater benefits and privileges if a conflict is successfully waged 
than if the current status quo is preserved” (Organski and Kugler, 1989, p. 175). In other words, 
the dissatisfied [rising] power will challenge the status quo if/when it concludes the ends are 
more important that the means.  
Though true motivations behind a regime’s decision on whether to become involved in an 
international crisis may never be uncovered, it is important to weigh the circumstances 
surrounding them to better predict involvement in the future. Diversionary theory studies make 
the case that the “rally around the flag” effect inherently makes the tactic reliant on popular 
support (DeRouen, 1995, p. 671-95; James and ONeal, 1991, 307-32; Meernik, 2004; Mitchell 
and Thies, 2013, 230-60). Tir and Singh (2013) find that administrations enjoy greater public 
support in countries that were involved in foreign crises, relative to those that were not (pg. 84). 
This, along with the lack of evidence that the public punishes leaders who engage in foreign 
crises, creates an incentive structure for a leader facing faltering support to engage in a foreign 
crisis (Tir and Singh, 2013, p. 97). However, the diversionary theory is subject to variables 
outside of these conclusions, including the economy, type of government, and social factors of 
the individual [from which support is gained or lost].  
In an authoritarian state, the decision unit usually has the power to determine how a state 
is going to respond to a foreign policy issue. Once the leader’s position is known, those with 
differing positions generally cease to express them (Hermann, Preston, Korany, & Shaw, 2001, 
p. 84). Knowledge about a leader’s reactions to political constraints (domestic, international, 
organizational, etc.) can suggest what lies at the heart of a leader’s political agenda (Hermann, 
Preston, Korany, & Shaw, 2001, p. 98). In other words, there is a strong correlation between 





However, as expressed in realist theories, these individual characteristics are not necessarily 
relevant to the outcome of foreign policy goals.       
Johnston (1995) defines strategic culture as: an integrated system of symbols (i.e. causal 
axioms, languages, analogies, metaphors, etc.) that acts to establish pervasive and long-lasting 
strategic preferences by formulating concepts of the role and efficacy of military force in 
interstate political affairs, and by clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that 
the strategic preferences seem uniquely realistic and efficacious (222). In fact, O’Neill (1999) 
argues that symbolism (through honor, social face, prestige, and moral authority) play a profound 
role in defining international relations (xi). In cases of international dispute, political game 
theory must also be considered. Gain theory is predicated on the idea that people rationally 
pursue goals subject to constraints imposed by physical resources and expected behavior 
(Meirowitz and McCarty, 2007, p. 6). The war of attrition model follows similar logic. The war 
of attrition model, a method of predicting whether state will go to war, asserts that audience costs 
are an important factor in weighing risk of war (Fearon, 1994, p. 577). In other words, the 
domestic audience is a major factor in considering to wage war.  
Assertiveness 
 There is no scholarly consensus regarding the definition of “assertiveness” in 
international relations. Hurrell (2010) defines assertiveness as a constructive activism to 
international life. Alternatively, many scholars refer to assertiveness as imperialistic, 
nationalistic, or anti-normative behavior (Cox, 2007; Tsygankov, 2008; Migdalovitz, 2010). 
Johnston (2013) argues that a much simpler definition can me implied: a form of assertive 
diplomacy that explicitly threatens to impose costs on another actor that are clearly higher than 





Johnston (2013) argues that proponents of the nationalist argument “offer no theory about 
how popular sentiments are translated into foreign policy” (37). He offers that in an authoritarian 
system, there are no electoral costs to ignoring public opinion. Alternatively, Gries (2004) 
highlights the influence that popular nationalist movements play in Chinese foreign policy (134). 
Swaine and Tellis’ (2000) “calculative” model offer the most comprehensive explanation for 
Chinese aggressiveness. This model, largely aligned with realism, argues that China is a rational 
actor that has strategically chosen assertive calculations (xi.). 
Forming Public Opinion 
According to Shannon’s (1993) information theory, the signals from the decision makers 
are encoded into messages and conveyed by the media to reach the domestic and international 
audience, or information sink, after decoding (p. 212). The information sink then gives 
appropriate feedback through praise or protest. Lei and Mengli (2014) assert that the encoding 
and conveyance of the media are critical, as they determine the premise of the correct decoding, 
which signals the information sink receives, and thus the corresponding feedback (p. 96). In 
other words, the media is the most important channel for the dissemination of information, as it 
naturally plays a pivotal role in the settlement of international disputes (Lei and Mengli, 2014, p. 
97). 
Entman (2007) defines framing as an omnipresent process in politics and policy analysis. 
It involves “selecting a few aspects of a perceived reality and connecting them together in a 
narrative that promotes a particular interpretation”. Frames can function in up to four ways: 
define problems, specify causes, convey moral assessments, and endorse remedies. Frames 
introduces or enhance the availability and apparent importance of certain ideas for evaluating a 





elements of schemas that were stored in the past. Fiske and Taylor (1991) define schemas as 
“cognitive structures that represent knowledge about a concept or type of stimulus, including its 
attributes and the relations among attributes” (131). Schemas fit new perceptions to an existing 
organization of knowledge. Therefore, prior knowledge allows the reader to make sense of new 
information (consciously or not) by deciding how the new material fits into their understanding 
and feelings of the world (Entman, 2010).  
Agenda building typically focuses on the degree of issue salience correspondence 
between the media and the public (McCombs, 1993). Agenda building examines the transfer of 
salience between the news media and audiences, usually from a particular interest group or group 
of elites, to the news media and subsequently to the public (Kim and Kiousis, 2012). Building 
upon this, second-level agenda-setting examines attribute salience as a component of the agenda-
building process. Previous research in second-level agenda setting indicates that news media 
highlight certain aspects of objects while simultaneously ignoring others to “help stakeholders 
develop an understanding about objects” (Coleman and Wu, 2010; Fahmy, Wanta, and Nisbet, 
2012; Wanta, Golan, and Lee, 2004). There are two types of attribute saliency that agenda-
building research examines: substantive and affective attributes. Substantive attributes refer to 
personality traits linked to a news object (Golan and Wanta, 200l; McCombs et al., 1997), while 
affective attributes refer to the overall tone of news coverage: negative, neutral, or positive 
(Shaefer, 2007; Takeshita, 2006).  
Countless governments take active measures in attempting to shape global narrative 
regarding both their leaders and their foreign policies (Cheng, Golan, and Kiousis, 2016, p. 747). 
Literature on mediated public diplomacy has identified an array of tactics aimed at shaping 





2013), television and print advertising (Fullerton and Kendrick 2013), social media platforms 
(Hayden 2011; Zhang 2013), and government-sponsored satellite channels (Fahmy, Wanta, and 
Nisbet 2012; Powers and Yousmans 2012; Samuel-Azran 2013). These approaches have proven 
critical for states to maintain preferred domestic narratives. In fact, Manheim and Albritton 
(1983) found that states that received public relations counsel were able to improve their 
visibility and valence in news content (pg #). 
Nationalism 
Nationalism is closely related to the “interest of the state” and features a unique loyalty to 
the national government (Chen, 2004, p. 31). Wei and Liu (2002) argue that as European 
nationalism is generally associated with a strong pride and even racism against the “other” 
(foreigners), and Chinese nationalism similarly surfaced as a Han-oriented chauvinism (9). 
Cheng (2019) highlights this correlation between racism and nationalism: Chinese patriotism is 
not just about defending the nation, but also protecting the race (6). Nationalism generally refers 
to one’s support for their nation, which includes national image (Gries, 2004, p. 9), an emotional 
significance to standing in the international community (Tajfel, 1981, p. 255), and any behavior 
designed to “restore, maintain, or advance” public image of said nation (Greenfield, 1992, p. 3). 
Kedourie (1961) notes that a state can only become great in proportion to its population and the 
prosperity of its people. Therefore, the cohesion of the state, and its subsequent loyalty, depend 
on the state’s capacity to ensure said welfare (11-2). This dependence also includes the state’s 
perceived capacity to provide for its people: regardless of substantiated effectiveness.  
There are four general entities associated with a nation (Wang, 2003, p. 6). These very 
unique conditions help to shape the definition of a nation. First, an ethnic group of a common 





domestic sovereignty are concerned with how the individual is connected with the larger group 
(Elmer, 2008; Greimanm 2010), Zuck (2016) argues that a written constitution also plays a factor 
on sovereignty: political rather than racial ties (8, 28). 
Next is the consideration of one’s cultural community. This historical heritage is the 
essence of a nation. It is defined as a distinctive civilization embodied in common patterns of 
language, customs, norms behavior, myths, and symbols. This definition of a nation is more 
inclusive than the first, as those with external ethnic origins can also participate. Grimm and 
Cooper (2015) first discusses “popular sovereignty”: sovereignty lies within, and cannot be 
transferred from, the people (Grimm and Cooper, 2015, p. 40). Grimm describes popular 
sovereignty with the creation of the U.S. in mind. He details the intricacies involved with 
sovereignty after the federation was created and separated from England: “who owns the 
sovereignty that no longer belonged to England?” (36) The short answer is that the federal 
parliament did. The people (and individual states) retained their voice and will through the vote 
but the sovereignty of this new nation belonged to the federal Congress. The constitution, 
emulating from the people, existed as a “regulator between the [government] and the [people] 
and thus preserves their popular sovereignty” (Grimm and Cooper, 2015, p. 37). 
Third is the sovereign state condition. This concept is based on the territorial and legal 
dimensions of a nation. Those living in the same territorial-political-legal unit are considered 
belonging to the nation, regardless of their ethnic or cultural background. Marsonet (2017) 
argues that although national sovereignty has largely become old-fashioned, it will long remain 
one of the “most important principle in international affairs” (40-1). She describes the more 
common ideas of supranational, national, and subnational sovereignty (40). She contends, as a 





sovereignty to world international organizations (41). What is not taken seriously in this 
argument are specific events. This argument addresses international relations as a theory, but 
states’ relationships (case-based or regionally) are derived from their individual national 
sovereignty. Unless acted upon, by a supranational institution, states’ actions are their own 
(Milward, 1993, p. 9). 
The fourth and final condition for a nation is a non-exclusive free association of citizens 
held together by a liberal popular culture. Habermas (1999) asserts that this collection of 
citizenry is crystallized around a set of “abstract procedures and principles”, therefore allowing 
an alternative focus of loyalty. This civic model of a nation is sustained by an agreement of its 
members, typically through a political creed, and without regard for descent, race, ethnic, or 
cultural backgrounds (Spencer & Wollman, 2002, p. 101). This U.S. is frequently cited as an 
example of the civic model, as a “non-national” nation (Wang, 2003, p. 4).  
Information Control 
In a study of how censorship is employed during the rise of nationalism, Cairns and 
Carlson (2012) found that states use social media to highlight the public opinions that best fit the 
official narrative, particularly during times of crisis (28). In their specific case study, China used 
social media, along with official state messages, to manipulate protests and event circumstances 
to support party objectives (40). This use of information control is critical to maintaining 
patriotism and party support when it otherwise may not be. Unfortunately, ‘no scholarly 
consensus about the effect of new media on politics in authoritarian regimes’ (Bulovsky, 2019, 
23). However, Downs (1957), assuming states are rational actors, has created 2 categories for 
describing how political leaders use social media: uni-directional and multi-directional 





Multi-directional describes an open and circular flow of discourse, with engagements of 
opposing opinions (135-150). Bulovsky’s research theorizes that autocratic leaders exhibit uni-
directional tendencies which makes them less present, less willing to engage, and less willing to 
listen (25). 
 In a more practical sense, an individual’s freedom, or self-realization, lies in their identity 
with the whole; a sense of belonging to a larger society. A state positions itself in a unique 
situation, where it serves to fulfill this inherit sense of individual belonging. In this sense, as the 
state serves the interests of a collection of individuals, the state can more easily be placed 
“higher” than the individual (Kedourie, 1961, p. 38). Kedourie argues that the state serves as the 
creator of one’s freedom in an internal and spiritual sense, not just in the material sense (47); 
individual freedoms only have meaning in the collective being (82). Kedourie explains that 
nationalist doctrine, language, race, and culture all combine to create the [perceived] common 
entity: the nation (73).  
A state employs information control for official and unofficial reasons. Officially, a state 
can claim that information n control is a public service; an average citizen cannot adequately 
discern which information is factual. A state may also argue that, for reasons of national cultural 
stability, it must take these efforts to ensure its citizens’ patriotic commitment to their heritage. 
More accurately, unofficially, a state employs information control tactics as a means to control 
the narrative to ensure domestic support. If a state controls every aspect of information that its 
citizenry has available, gaining and maintaining domestic support becomes that much easier 
(Widmer, 1961, p. 39-61).    
We must consider how the use of censorship fits into the national goals of a developing 





governments to manipulate public opinion. Defining censorship is quite complex; however, to 
borrow ideas from Widmer (1961), it is a clash between public and private opinions (39). 
Therefore, in order to study censorship, we must examine approved and “unofficial” writings on 
specific topics in history. Widmer examines historical arguments for and against the employment 
of censorship in a broader sense, notably whether propaganda can reasonably be self-censored by 
an “average” person. Tiffert (2019) argues that information control, specifically through digital 
platforms, offer dynamic mastery over citizens’ memory and identity (554). 
More recently, autocratic states have increasingly utilized technological advances for 
their benefit. Social media, websites, cell phones, satellite television, radio, and newspapers have 
all been used as catalysts in support of regime rhetoric (Edmond, 2013, 1422). Edmond (2013) 
developed a model of predicting how information control affects autocratic regimes (1423). It 
predicts that as news sources are more centralized, the likelihood of a regime’s survival 
increases. In other words, as the number of available sources of information increases, the 
regime is easier to overthrow (1423). This fact alone gives us a better understanding of why 
authoritarian states have such an interest to maintain complete control over available news 
sources.  
Galtung (2003) proposed the idea of peace journalism to describe the framing of stories 
of conflict and highlight the peaceful nature of initiatives. This idea is the counter to war 
journalism, which is elite-oriented and focuses on the here and now. War journalism reports 
about the who, what, where, and when of a conflict, and neglect the factors that contributes to 
them. Because of this stark distinction between facts, it advocates a “them vs. us" mentality, and 
only exposes atrocities of the “other side” (Tehranian, 2002). Peace journalism, alternatively, 





(Lynch and McGoldrick, 2007). Multiple scholars found that war and peace journalism is 
supported by the framing theory: “construct of a communication – its language, visual and 
messengers – and the way it signals to the listener or observer how to interpret and classify new 
information” (258). 
Manheim (1994) found that news framing analyses usually cover three aspects: visibility, 
valence, and frame genres. Visibility refers to both the amount of coverage and the prominence 
level of an event/issue or a nation receives in the news coverage. Prominence is usually 
demonstrated by certain typical elements such as the article’s placement in the newspaper or web 
sites, the headline, the visual tools associating with the text, the mention on the evening 
television news etc. Valence or slant is the tone of a news story or comment regarding certain 
frames. It is believed to have the potential to generate behavioral effects. Entman (2007) also 
stressed that agenda setting, priming and framing fit together as tools of power, and he connected 
them to explicit definitions of news slant and bias. 
Brewer, Graf, & Willnat (2003) found that framing on mass media can significantly 
influence an individual’s perception of social reality. Xie (2020) defines frames as “basic 
cognitive structures which guide the perception and representation of reality (44). Gitlin (1980) 
expands framing in include a more deliberate shaping of a perceived reality. Gitlin argues that 
framing is the “persistent selection, emphasis, and exclusion” of events and issues by mass 
media. The effect, then, is a systematically constructed narrative created by suppressing details 
and elaborating certain elements of rhetoric.  
For a more strategic vantagepoint of news framing, many scholars look to “episodic 
framing” and “thematic framing” (De Vreese, 2014; Holton, Lee & Coleman, 2014; Kim, 2015). 





attributions for events (Iyengar, 1996, p. 62). Contrarily, “thematic” frames focus more on 
broader social issues, such as social, political, and economic forces; these frames encourage 
viewers to make external attributions (Iyengar, 1996, p. 62). Episodic framing descries concrete 
events that illustrate issues, while thematic framing presents collective or general evidence 
(Yang and Heng, 2019). 
Cohen (1963) argues that media exert little sway over “what people think,” yet are 
“stunningly successful” in telling them “what to think about” (13). Nagel (1975) argues that 
power is the ability to get others to act as one wants. Inducing people to think as desired requires 
elites to select exactly which information the public should know. Outside of coercion, 
embedding cues on how this media-shaped narrative coheres with prior attitudes and beliefs, is 
the ideal method of framing (392). Though Entman (2010) researches this method on 
democracies, this framing technique could just as easily, if not more easily, be applied to 
autocratic states.   
Yang and Heng (2019) conducted a content analysis s of news articles from The Star, the 
largest circulation in Malaysia. The research analyzed three years (2014-2016) of content of 
coverage of the SCS. These were key dates to consider, as many events took place during this 
period that both positively and negatively affected the Chinese-Malaysian relationship. Events 
included the “Malaysia-China Friendship Year”, an outspoken Chinese foreign ambassador to 
Malaysia, and the Permanent Court of Arbitration's (PCA) ruling that China had no historic 
rights to the SCS. The study aimed to examine the reporting of the SCS by The Star, specifically 
in the theoretical context of war/peace journalism and framing (17-22).  The study coded for the 
three aspects of framing (visibility, valence, and frame genres) and coded for eight different 





were nearly 40% more than indicators of peace journalism. In fact, Lee and Maslog (2005) found 
similar evidence of four Asian conflicts that were dominated by war journalism. 
Yang and Heng (2019) found that the most salient indicators of The Star’s coverage of 
the SCS were “elite-oriented”, “difference-oriented”, and “focuses on here and now” (30). 
Francis (2002) asserts that when editors and reporters inform readers about the “who, what, 
when, where, why, and how” relating to conflicts, they are also corresponding to what peace 
researchers call “conflict dynamics” (28). In order to be considered peace journalism, the piece 
should identify “its history, recent causes, and internal composition—the different parties, the 
nature of their involvement, their perspectives, positions and motivations, and the different 
relationships between them in terms of power, allegiance and interests” (Francis, 2002). In other 
words, increasing not only the number of sources, but also the amount of context, decreases the 















1. Increased domestic intellectual constraints affect adaptation of foreign policy (Zhao, 1997). 
Authoritarian regimes generally use information control to curb alternative information and 
dissent perceived as a power to their rule (Michaelson, 2018). Regimes have historically used 
digital technologies to shape public opinion, mobilize supporters, and track emerging grievances; 
all to update legitimation strategies and administrative performance (Goebel, 2013; Gunitsky, 
2015; MacKinnon, 2011; Morozov, 2011). Because Beijing identifies the SCS is identified as a 
core interest (U.S. State Department, 2010), it will utilize information control tactics to rally 
support for more assertive foreign policies in the SCS.   
2. Realism best explains foreign policy aggressiveness. China’s only near-peer competitor in the 
region is the U.S. (based on definition from Szayna et al., 2001) The debate over maritime 
disputes is the primary factor keeping the U.S. “looming” over Chinese politics (with the 
exception of Taiwan) (Haass, 2019). Demonstrating a defensive, persecuted role, China could 
potentially win the favor of the international community; driving out the U.S. and leaving a 
power vacuum for China to fill as the untested regional superpower.  
3. China frames newspaper content in a way that positively reflects its zero-sum solution to SCS 
disputes. The framing of nationally sensitive issues is strictly controlled, as the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) sends notices to all the newsrooms, gives direction on framing, and 
orders reprint articles from party mouthpieces (Kuang, 2014). Kuang and Wei (2018) find that 
the autonomy of the news organizations in non-democracies, such as China, to frame political 
issues largely depends on the geographic relevance of the issue due to the scope of the control 







 The purpose of this research is to discuss the relationship between newspaper framing 
and assertive foreign policy. Specifically, this research analyzes newspapers published by state-
sponsored Chinese media sources. The newspapers collected were published between 2011 and 
2016, a period of Chinese assertive behavior that Tyrcanyi (2018) describes as unequivocal (43, 
53). This time period was selected to address Johnston’s (2013) assertion that People’s Republic 
of China (PRC) actions are neither new nor assertive. In fact, Johnston (2016) suggests that 
Chinese nationalism, and the affect that it has on diversionary conflict, has decreased since 2009 
(9). Turcsányi (2018) highlights that little objective analysis has been conducted on Chinese 
behavior after 2011, from the perspective of the ‘assertiveness’ concept (11). This newspaper 
content analysis serves to measure the way in which Chinese media attempts to portray its 
assertive actions in the SCS.  
China is ruled by a one-party authoritarian regime that is determined to retain its 
exclusive grip on political power (Friedberg, 2018, p. 17). China’s rulers clearly believe the 
ideological realm to be a crucially important domain of competition. Beijing’s obsessive desire 
to squelch dissent, block the inward flow of unfavorable news bespeaks an insecurity that is, in 
itself, a form of strategic vulnerability (Friedberg, 2018, p. 9). Tsang (2019) argues that Xi 
Jinping seeks to reclaim China’s place as the most magnificent great power in the world (p. 306). 
This task is to be achieved by pursuing the China Dream of national rejuvenation, which can 
only be secured by adhering closely to the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC) 
(Xinhua, 2018).  
Never forget why you started, and you can accomplish your mission. The original 
aspiration and the mission of Chinese Communists is to seek happiness for the Chinese 
people and rejuvenation for the Chinese nation. This original aspiration, this mission, is 





must always breathe the same breath as the people, share the same future, and stay truly 
connected to them. The aspirations of the people to live a better life must always be the 
focus of our efforts. We must keep on striving with endless energy toward the great goal 
of national rejuvenation. (Jinping, 2017) 
 
Specifically, this analysis follows Yang and Heng’s (2019) study of a Malaysian 
newspaper framing of SCS incidents, this research analyzes newspapers from 99 newspapers 
from state-sponsored sources, including China Daily, People’s Daily, Xinhua, and Global Times. 
Each of the newspapers were identified as fitting into one or multiple indicators of peace and/or 
war journalism. The time frame after the event took place was also considered, giving better 
insight in to how Chinese media presents information to its domestic audience. As Johnston 
(2004) found very little systematic research on Chinese nationalism, except a few rare cases, this 
research attempts to significantly fill that gap. The presence of war journalism indicators offer 
insight into framing approaches, and preferred valence usage, all the way from CCP leadership to 















Chapter 2: Nationalism and Information 
Control in China 
 
Information Control 
For thousands of years, Chinese rulers have utilized the manipulation of language as a 
tool to legitimate their rule (Gries, 2004, p. 9). Historical allegory is just another tool aimed at 
maintaining unity, pride, and unwavering support for the CCP. China is now attempting to build 
an internet that is big enough to support its rapid-growing economy, while at the same time 
maintain enough control to ensure its power monopoly (Petley, 2009, p. 101). It does so through 
its 30,000 internet police officers and 12 separate government departments with authority over 
the internet. China also built the “Great Firewall of China”, the world’s most sophisticated 
information barrier, which acts as a gatekeeper for all information entering and leaving China. 
This ensures all available information originates from or is filtered through the Communist Party 
of China. Western companies like Yahoo, Microsoft, and Google all operate in China, but use 
specifically designed Chinese versions of their products that conform to these regulations. For 
example, Microsoft admitted to automatically blocking “sensitive content” such as any mention 
of “freedom” or “democracy” (107-8). 
The CCP values the power of internet controls, especially those of current events and 
political discussion. It is evident that the CCP is specifically interested in threats to regime 
legitimacy, political stability, or national image (Tang, 2005, p. 82). However, recently Beijing 
has begun to loosen the grip on media control (AP, 2003). Based on a compilation of newspapers 
and magazine sources, government criticisms continue to surface past government controls 





highlighting its role as more of a “supervisor” of information, rather than a gatekeeper. The 
interactions between the Chinese people and the CCP are crucial and central to nationalist 
politics. Legitimacy relies on implanted strategies, and how they evolve over time.  
Chinese media discourse is different than Western media discourse due to China’s unique 
social system and political economy (Zhang, 2014, p. 1). Where Western media has archived 
independence through commercialization, the CCP has reinforced its control of the media 
through commercialization. As China has shifted from isolation to a global economic power, its 
news media has a major influence over the changing society and itself is quickly changing. 
Taubman (1998) highlights the importance of regulation of information and ideas to regime 
security (p. 258). The better equipped governments are to preserve political stability and quell 
potential disconnect with the polity, the better its chances at survival. However, particularly with 
nondemocratic states, such benefit is compromised when societal actors acquire the capacity to 
breach the state’s monopoly on information and alternative ideology. The CCP has been more 
than successful at sustaining this monopoly. As Lee (2018) points out: 
…most Chinese people still adhere to the imaginary the rulers have imposed, through 
ideology and economic inducement—despite the failure, so far, of this officially 
projected imaginary to provide individual and societal autonomy, or even the most basic 
political rights…[including] the creation of an underclass of ex-peasant migrant workers 
deprived of full-socio-economic rights, the failure to address the political claims of ethnic 
minorities…and the lack of political rights for all of China’s citizens. (p. 39) 
 
The CCP was driven by humiliations of sufferings brought by the West, to mend and 
rejuvenate the [image of] the Chinese nation (Wei and Liu, 2002, p. 77). The CCP has made 
evident their [authoritarian] stance: a strong centralized state is the preferred prerequisite for a 





Chinese people are rooted in two main sources: the government’s promotion of strengthening 
legitimacy, and the public’s yearning for a stronger national identity (107). In fact, this 
increasing national sentiment is evident multiple surveys regarding Beijing’s role in Asia and the 
world (107). Interestingly, Chen also finds a correlation between strong nationalist sentiment and 
diffuse support (108). In other words, Chinese people are willing to sacrifice democratization for 
sociopolitical “stability” under the authoritarian regime.   
Wang (2012) notes a strong relationship between culture and politics (230). China has 
worked relentlessly, through its “patriotic education”, introduced at a young age. This patriotic 
education is key to creating a sense of deep culture of national history and collective historic 
memory. Creating this subconscious, shared narrative at a young age is key to easily 
manipulating a rhetoric that supports future foreign policy issues. More precisely, “deep culture 
remains dormant until confronted with a need to interact” (Wang, 2012, p. 230). To be clear, the 
emergence of nationalism in China was not a grassroots movement (Wang, 2012, p. 75). This 
was a strategic, long-term technique beginning at the turn of the century (Wang, 2012, p. 77), 
based largely on creating feelings of national humiliation, adverting blame for suffering, and 
blind patriotism. 
Podeh (2000) argues that forging a nation’s collective memory is integral to nation 
building. Creating said link between history and memory is key to implanting knowledge and 
values in the younger generation (65). She continues that in this sense, the educational system is 
another arm of the state that acts to ensure a very particular version of historic collective 
memory. Mehlinger (1985) even refers to school textbooks as modern “village storytellers”; they 
are responsible for conveying to youth what they should know about their own culture, as well as 





of prejudice and stereotyping in describing the “other” (170), or all those that oppose said created 
collective memory. Kedourie (1961) explains that education must have a central position in 
nationalist states; schools are instruments of state policy, much like the army or police (83-4). 
The “Century of Humiliation” (百年耻辱), also known as Century of National Shame, is 
central to national narrative of Chinese nationalism (Gries, 2004, p. 46). Kedourie (1961) argues 
that nationalists “make use of the past in order to subvert the present” (70). In other words, the 
present determines the past. This idea is central to understanding how the CCP uses the past to 
shape nationalistic rhetoric and patriotic world-views. The Century of Humiliation is 
fundamental to Chinese views of the world, and is continuously reworked to the evolving 
meaning of what it means to be Chinese (Gries, 2004, p. 46). In this way, the CCP can highlight 
“humiliations” of the past to fit whichever narrative it is pursuing at that time. Major conflicts 
repeatedly referred to include the two Opium Wars, the Sino-Japanese War, the Boxer Rebellion, 
and the “War of Resistance against Japan” (Second Sino-Japanese War) (47).  
The Chinese patriotic education campaign, launched shortly after the Tiananmen 
Incident, was one of many wide-scale attempts at ideological reeducation (Wang, 2012, p. 96). 
The CCP’s response to the challenges of belief and regime legitimacy was the implementation of 
this reeducation campaign. To counter democratic and other civic protests, nationalism was 
cultivated to provide a “common foundation for public consent” (Ching, 1996, p. 34) [of the 
authoritarian values of the CCP]. The major goal of the campaign was to ensure that [younger] 
Chinese people were thoroughly aware of the “humiliating experience in the face of Western and 
Japanese incursions” and the triumphs of the CCP revolution leading to national independence 





narrative that emphasized the “bullying and humiliation” of Chinese people under foreign 
powers. This particular interpretation strengthened CCP legitimacy by emphasizing its role in 
revolution and sacrifice that prevented a weak and divided China (98).  
Yang (2017) found that China’s internet censorship regime has been refined in response 
to changing platforms of online expression (p. 1946). At the center of these new forms of 
censorship is a set of discourses of “civility” and “civilization”. Captured under the Chinese term 
wenming (文明), both are used to demobilize online activism by attacking its emotional and 
allegedly irrational behavior. As civilization, wenming operates as an ideological discourse that 
legitimates the governance and administration of society. As civility, it functions as a strategic 
technology and tool for governance and self-governance, including the governance of the 
Internet (Yang, 2017, p. 1946). Curiously, the term wenming has a Chinese history and political 
context, the discourses of civility and civilization have a longer and global history associated 
with nation building, colonialism, and the development of the modern individual (Duara, 2001; 
Elias, 1939/2000; G. W. Gong, 1984). Yang asserts that conditioning the individual of the 
undesirable connotations surrounding incivility is precisely what turns Chinese citizens into 
supporters of the official language of civility. Therefore, encouraging civility enhances the 
legitimacy of official discourse (Yang, 2017, p. 1946).   
Outside of manipulation from official sources, the CCP also employs a veritable army of 
internet commentators to sing government’s praises and attack its critics. A Harvard University 
team carried out an empirical study on the 50 Cent (50c) Party, finding about 488 million social 
media comments per year aimed to deflect public criticism (King, Pan, & Roberts, 2017, p. 485). 





method of online censorship. The 50c party is mostly composed of government employees 
contributing part time outside of their regular jobs, with a smaller proportion composed of 
ordinary citizens paid piecemeal for their work (King, Pan, and Roberts, 2017, p. 497)  In April 
2014, President Xi Jinping visited Xinjiang, where he promised to ramp up the government’s 
response to terrorism. Shortly after the visit, an attack on the Urumqi railway station (in 
Xinjiang) killed three people and injured dozens more. Immediately following the attack, 
searches for “Urumqi blast” were blocked on Baidu and Sina Weibo (large search engine and 
social media platforms), and more than 3,000 posts were made on various social networks. 
Curiously, none of the posts praised the Xi regime. Rather, they praised China’s good 
governance, economic opportunities, and the “mass line” (Waddell, 2017).  King, Pan, and 
Roberts (2017) find eight similar “event-distraction” cases between 2013-2014 alone (pg. 488).  
CCP authorities control the framing of a nationally sensitive issue by ordering news 
organizations to use the news articles produced by state news agencies only when they want to 
report an issue (Kuang and Wei, 2018, p. 1436).  It is unclear exactly which frames are 
consistent with the government stance (Kuang and Wei, 2018, p. 1436), but the geographic 
relevance of a sensitive news issue (and subsequent political control) is believed to influence 
how the issue is framed (Kuang, 2014). Those issues deemed “nationally sensitive” are ordered 
to be trans-printed from state news agencies, and according to CCP guidelines (Feng et al., 2012; 
Ma, 2005; Wu, 2006). The CCP has overwhelming control over the media’s framing base. In 
fact, Zhang and Fleming (2005) found that the CCP controls media coverage in three ways: the 
propaganda department appointing the editors in-chief at the respective newspapers, the 
propaganda department issuing directives or circulars at various levels, and top government 





The link between civilizing the Internet and national security is neither new nor specific 
to China (Dauvergne & LeBaron, 2014). Civilizing, in this context, refers to the “purification of 
the cultural environment on the Internet” (People’s Daily, 2009). Yang (2017) finds two recent 
developments that link the civilization of the Internet and national security (p. 1951). First, the 
2013 Snowden incident, where a classified information about surveillance programs run by the 
U.S. National Security Agency (NSA), brought light to a corporate-state surveillance apparatus 
(Giroux, 2015). Following the incident, Chinese discourse gained a new moral persuasion among 
the Chinese population; specifically, it gave Chinese nationalists new leverage for controlling 
online information flows under the guise of national security (Yang, 2017, p. 1951). Second, the 
Chinese Cybersecurity Law was passed in 2017 to consolidate and strengthen the CCP’s control 
over information controls in the Internet. The growing use of national security in Chinese 
Internet governance shows that increasingly, the Chinese government is invoking the global 
discourse of securitization to legitimate Internet censorship and surveillance (Deibert and 
Rohozinski, 2008).  
News sources 
The Xinhua News Agency is one of the most influential propaganda apparatuses of the 
CCP. Xinhua has developed a nationwide network for news collection and distribution (Xin, 
2012, p. 20). Even before the foundation of the PRC, Xinhua was responsible for creating and 
managing the CCP’s newspapers. Xinhua officially became the only legitimate national news 
agency in 1949, with three specific missions: to present the voice of the government, to 
implement centralized control over its branches to maintain a unitary tone, and to guide domestic 





on Xinhua’s acceptance of their stories, they were compelled to publish Xinhua’s exclusive 
reports on politically sensitive issues (Xin, 2006, p. 48-9).  
Lynch (1999) highlights the tensions between Xinhua and local newspapers (pg. 160). As 
Xinhua monopolized the provision of cross-regional and international news prior to the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-76), local newspapers and radio stations had limited autonomy in selecting 
news of local happenings.  Instead, they were forced to use Xinhua’s reports about outside 
regions (Lynch, 1999, p. 160). This tension was largely caused by Xinhua’s neglect and 
devaluation of local press, as it saw “central newspapers” (i.e. People’s Daily) as of more 
importance and power (Guo, 1997, 61-9). For Xinhua journalists, the political effect of a news 
story was determined by the number of newspapers that published the item without editing it 
(Guo, 1997, p. 51– b 60). 
The late 1990s brought a noticeable period of globalization of Chinese culture, as China 
began to develop as a market economy (Xin, 2006, p. 53). Chinese news organizations, 
particularly Xinhua and People’s Daily, had to face the unavoidable processes of marketization, 
which impacted the relationship between the two. First, an unprecedented media boom, resulting 
in an increase in the number of titles of newspapers published in China from 69 in 1979 (Lee, 
2000, p. 47) to 2137 in 2002 (ZGXWNJS, 2003, p. 63). Second, Xinhua and newspaper 
organizations became only party government supported.  By the end of 1994, the majority of 
national and provincial Party newspapers operated with reduced subsidies from the government, 
forcing them to seek other revenue sources (Tang, 2003, p. 113). Third, main media concepts 
were redefined. Among Chinese academics, the notion of media as a combination of a 
propaganda tool and a means to inform became more popular (He, 2002, p. 8). Traditional news 





agencies or wholesalers. However, as a receiver of government subsidies, Xinhua’s credibility 
and competitiveness is damaged in the increasingly globalized information market (International 
Communication Conference, 2011, p. 10) 
Apart from Reference News, most Xinhua publications were launched in the 1980s and 
1990s (Xinhua, 2000), after failed Xinhua business ventures outside of reporting (Cai, 1999, p. 
86-9). In the late 1980s, Xinhua became a mixture of wholesaler and retailer of news, distinct 
from its traditional mixture of agency and newspaper operations since its conception. Local 
newspapers offered Xinhua access to mass readership, bringing in a considerable amount of 
advertising revenue (Xin, 2006, p. 52). However, from 2002 to 2006, Xinhua closed a number of 
nonprofitable business enterprises and gradually separated its news and information marketing 
from its editorial pieces. Xinhua 08 was launched in 2007, which provided five new types of 
services: real time information, real time data, economic data, financial models and trading 
platform. The purpose of this new platform was to attract non-media clients, governmental 
regulatory agencies, and those individuals that would otherwise utilize Bloomberg or Reuters 
(Wu, 2007). 
Xinhua also offers TV news services. Beginning as a small-scale production in the early 
1990s, China Xinhua News Network Corporation (CNC) works closely with local satellite TV 
stations to provide Chinese and English-language news television (Xinhua, 2009). As a part of 
the CCP’s increasing utilization of soft power, Xinhua TV services were to be branded to target 
Chinese and overseas audiences globally. In early 2009, a new Xinhua news channel was 
launched worldwide, modelled on CNN International or Al-Jazeera English (Oriental Morning 
Post, 2009). In fact, by 2009 Xinhua launched several Chinese and English-language news and 





The People’s Daily newspaper began its operation in 1948, with involvement by a 
number of former Xinhua journalists (People’s Daily Online, 2018). It had a unique relationship 
with Xinhua, as it was also a central newspaper and official organ of the Central Committee of 
the CCP. The People’s Daily played a role in the CCP’s “thought-works”: “acted as the chief 
conduit of official interpretations of all political, economic, social, and cultural events – domestic 
and international – to party members and society at large throughout the country” (Lynch, 1999, 
p. 160). In fact, for local newspapers, acceptance by the People’s Daily was considered “a 
significant criterion by which to judge the quality of a news item” (Guo, 1997, pp. 51-60).  
The People’s Daily enjoys the highest editorial priority and privileges, and government 
documents and important editorials in the newspaper are aired on the national radio and 
television, and reprinted by local news media (Zhao, 1998). The central concept behind the 
People’s Daily is the “Party principle” (党性原则); “the news media must accept the Party’s 
guiding ideology as its own; that they must propagate the Party’s programs, policies, and 
directives; and that they must accept the Party’s leadership and stick to the Party’s organizational 
principles and press policies” (Tong and Cheng, 1993). Rosen (2000) identifies the paper’s 
fundamental role is to “to inform the public after an authoritative decision has been reached” (p. 
155).  
The People’s Daily, under the authority of the CPD, is one of the primary elements of the 
CCP propaganda system (宣传). The news agency is the chief conduit of official interpretations 
of important political, economic, social, and cultural events to Party members and ordinary 
people across China (Lynch, 1999). In fact, China regularly asserts its claims in the SCS by 





that China started to be more active in its diplomatic push since 2007 as a response to Vietnam’s 
increasing effort to individually develop its offshore oil fields (p. 2). 
As of 2013, China had the largest newspaper market in the world, its largest daily paper 
with a circulation of about three million (BBC, 2013). Even though journalism is increasingly 
commercialized, the CCP retains the ideological control of the newspapers (Zhang, 2014, p. 1). 
Newspapers and journalists alike enjoy autonomy, but all changes are engineered, approved, or 
supported by the CCP (Zhang, 2014, p. 1). There is a total of 18 national newspapers in China, 
over 150 regional newspapers, 11 business newspapers, seven technology newspapers, and four 
sports newspapers. However, the People’s Daily is the official newspaper of the CCP Central 
Committee and the Central Government (Xiong, Wei, and Zhang, 2016). More importantly, it is 
considered the most influential and authoritative paper in China, and has the largest circulation 
of any newspaper in the country. For major events and issues, the People’s Daily also sets the 
tone of coverage that other Chinese newspapers (national and local) have to follow (Song and 
Chang, 2012).  
The Global Times, a daily newspaper under the auspices of the People’s Daily, focuses 
on international issues. Both newspapers have a daily circulation of over 2.4 million, but the 
Global Times is deemed the “link between China and the world (Global Times, 2013). The 
Global Times, under the auspices of the People’s Daily, is known for its nationalistic and 
conservative voices, which may represent an official embrace of nationalism (Zhao, 2013, p. 
550; Duan, 2017, p. 891).     
The newspaper and magazine market in China are opening up in three stages. Zhang 
(2014) describes the three stages as advertising and distribution, non-news, and non-political. 





market while editorial operations remain unlisted. Examples include the Beijing Media 
Corporation, advertised by the Beijing Youth Daily on the Hong Kong stock exchange (p. 3). 
The second stage allows for foreign capital returns on fashion, entertainment, sport, and finance. 
The consolidation of Chinese media with reduced funding from the CCP creates an opportunity 
for foreign investors. Foreign publishers form partnerships with Chinese media corporations; 
publishers gain access to local knowledge and license to print, while Chinese publishers gain 
marketing and management expertise (Zhang, 2013, p. 4). The third stage allows non-political 
newspapers (evening and city papers run by the CCP, papers run by newspaper groups, and trade 
publications run by state-owned enterprises) to float on the stock market. By 2010, 147 state-run 
publishing houses transformed into self-financing corporations (Zhang, 2013, p. 4).  
Chinese Nationalism 
Chinese politics often follows that “surface and reality differ” (表里不一), which makes 
the study of Chinese nationalism as it relates to historical context that much more important.  
Gries (2004) asserts that the reader of Chinese political materials should listen to “the sound 
outside the strings” (弦外之音) (9). In other words, readers must have a deep understanding of 
historical and cultural context in order to fully comprehend the proper diplomatic sentiment that 
CCP leaders intend.  Chinese governments have traditionally sought to derive their power, 
through traditional texts, as righteous and benefiting of the people. Chinese governments have 
attempted to enforce nationalistic norms in all aspects of life: social, educational, and political. 
Multiple scholars have highlighted the concept of soft power as it relates to Confucian thinking, 
which emphasizes the power of the leader as a moral exemplar for others to follow (Ding, 2008; 





Stratfor (2012) defines Chinese nationalism as an uneasy relationship between the 
population’s feelings of pride, disappointment, and hope for China’s future and the CCP’s efforts 
to use these feelings as a tool for social management and securing Party control. What is 
particularly interesting about Chinese nationalism is how it has been altered in blatantly 
contradictory ways. For example, the view of Communist revolutionaries for the goal of nation-
building relied glorifying liberators during the Opium War at the heroism level. However, during 
the 1990s, this Century of Humiliation narrative gained traction, as the CCP wanted to highlight 
China as a victim. This victimization narrative highlighted The Rape of Nanking (1937-8), which 
marked the “Return to the Motherland” narrative that was meant to “wipe away” the above 
mentioned “national humiliation” (Gries, 2004, 47-9). The two narratives now coexist with each 
other, as young Chinese nationalists have returned to this idea of victimization. Gries (2004) 
mentions that many Chinese nationalists are now primed “to view American or Japanese actions 
as aggressive”, spreading anger and “desires for vengeance” (52-3). 
This contradictory presentation of Chinese nationalism by the CCP can be attributed to 
responsive authoritarianism. Przeworski (1999) defines a responsive government as one that 
“adopts policies signaled as preferred by citizens” (9). Multiple scholars assert that the Chinese 
party-state model has been durable longer than any other communist regime due to its 
“responsiveness” (Nathan, 2003; Reilly, 2011; Weller, 2011). In either case, the CCP faces a 
dilemma as to how it will continue to draw attention away from domestic problems. As the party 
was founded in popular nationalism (i.e. what is good for the Party is good for the country), 
continued rhetoric regarding the integration between the Party and the state is that much more 
important. Stratfor (2012) points out that this type of nationalist sentiment poses greater 





reform and prosperity. More recent demonstrators calling for Western-style reforms may soon 
call for alternative visions of China separate from the Party.  
The concept of modern nationalism was first observed in China at the turn of the 20th 
century. This modern Chinese nationalism displayed a strong ethnic, arguably xenophobic, strain 
in opposing imperialism and Manchu rule (Townsend, 1992, p. 114). First interpretations of this 
shift cite culturalism, a common historical heritage and acceptance of shared beliefs. Harrison 
(1969) identifies two elements of early Chinese culturalism in understanding its origins. First, the 
notion that China was the only true civilization; non-Chinese peoples may be military threats, but 
they could never be true rivals because of their cultural backwardness. Second, that Chinese 
rulers must be educated in Confucian principles. The rulers’ loyalty lied in principles, not a 
particular nation. Therefore, Chinese culturalism explains not just the empire’s capacity to 
survive, but also why it fell when an external culture penetrated China (Harrison, 1969; Wang, 
2003).  
The arrival of Marxism in the 20th century brought the popular nationalism argument to 
China. The working and peasant “masses”, an anti-imperialist force by definition, became agents 
of Chinese history (Cohen, 1997, pp. 227-45). When the Communists claimed victory in the 
revolution in 1949, mass nationalism became even more predominant. While Communist 
ideology follows that the masses “be given agency in leading the revolution”, dictates of 
nationalist politics demanded that such assertions be qualified by the ubiquitous “under the 
leadership of the Party” (Gries, 2004, p. 117). Therefore, if the CCP was a “party of the people”, 
they played a lead role in the nationalist revolution, with a Marxist view of mass nationalism 





The early 1990s brought a resurgence of nationalist and patriotic rhetoric among Chinese 
intellectuals and subsequently the Chinese public. Eager for a “win” for China, the Tiananmen 
Square incident and the fall of the Soviet Union translated into a public sense of China’s return 
to global prominence (Stratfor, 2012). China experienced a wave of economic growth after 1992, 
which was exemplified by the 1996 bestseller China Can Say No, a book written as a critique to 
China embracing Western values (Gries, 2004, p. 120). This eruption of national pride gained 
momentum with incidents like the 1999 Chinese Embassy bombing in Belgrade, Yugoslavia 
(Serbia) (caused by erroneous targeting data), and the EP-3 spy plane collision (resulting in the 
death of a Chinese pilot) (Rosenthal and Sanger, 2001). These events allowed for the perfect 
storm for Chinese academics and media personalities to fuel popular anger by attributing China’s 
history of suffering to Western imperialism (Stratfor, 2012).   
Chinese nationalism, beginning at the turn of the 20th century, configured itself largely in 
two forms: that of the national, and that of a member of the international community (Chen, 
2004, p. 4). Wei and Liu (2002) go on to explain the key characteristics of the Chinese national (
国民), which differs from the standard understanding of citizen in its focus on membership, 
belonging, and identity; not necessarily rights and civic duties (p. 6). In this sense, a Chinese 
national is one that can lay claim to this special relationship with the state, regardless of 
geographic realities. Chinese nationalism began with a sense of hope for a strong and healthy 
nation, specifically ideas of national reconstruction (rejuvenation), state-building, antiforeignism, 
and Marxism (9).  
One interpretation of Chinese nationalism is an aggressive, chauvinistic ideology 





nationalism is very unique and isolated from other forms of nationalism. Chinese nationalism is 
closely related to the “interest of the state” and a unique loyalty to the national government. Wei 
and Liu (2002) argue that as European nationalism is generally associated with a strong pride 
and even racism against the “other” (foreigners), and Chinese nationalism similarly surfaced as a 
Han-oriented chauvinism (9). Chinese nationalism began with a sense of hope for a strong and 
healthy nation, specifically ideas of national reconstruction (rejuvenation), state-building, 
antiforeignism, and Marxism (Chen, 2004, p. 31).  
Townsend (1992) asserts that there are four different Chinese nations that continue to 
exist (128). This fact alone highlights the struggle that the CCP faces in unifying nationalist 
rhetoric across China. The first form of nationalist rhetoric is that which is used all across China, 
Han and non-Han alike. Second is the ethnic nationalism, composed largely of Han-ethnic 
groups. Third are the “compatriots”, a product of ethnic nationalism, that is currently under a 
political authority other than China (i.e. Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao). Finally, the last form 
consists of geographically separated Chinese. This group includes those that retain some idea of 
dual nationality, with a continuing sense of cultural attachment to China (Townsend, 1992, p. 
128). Each of these terms of alignment are inherently nationalist, but the logic behind them 
differentiate the degree to which the person is aligned with the goals of the CCP.  
Though nationalism has been observed in democratic systems, nationalism generally 
implies exclusiveness while democracy is based on [some level] of inclusivity (Beethan and 
Boyle 1995). Zhong (2018) found that aggressive nationalism plays a strong role in Chinese 
urban residents’ political trust in the central government (75). Chinese nationalism is not about 





play in international issues. This link between less-informed citizenry and nationalistic trends is 
central to understanding how China utilizes information control in achieving its strategic goals: 
Chinese urban residents were not around national identity, but rather about feelings 
toward the outside world or outward nationalism: the role that China should play in Asia 
and the world and whether China should use force to take the Diaoyu Islands back from 
Japan, even though such an action could trigger a war with Japan. As mentioned before, 
Chinese nationalism is on the rise with rapid economic growth and increasing Chinese 
assertiveness in international affairs. In China as in other countries, foreign policy is still 
the dominant responsibility of the central government. People who have strong outward 
nationalist feelings have to place higher levels of political trust in the central government 
to implement more effective and aggressive foreign policy (Zhong, 2018, p. 79).   
There is debate over whether Confucianism and nationalism are compatible. One group 
offers that because Confucian universalism allows for anyone to become Chinese, so long as 
they accept the Sinocentric civilization. Others argue that Confucianism refers to only “all under 
heaven” (天下) (Gries, 2004, p. 8), which could be referred to as only China (assuming that 
China is the center of the universe). Both arguments warrant merit, but it seems that regardless, 
Confucianism has become the basis for this new Chinese nationalism. 
China, particularly the CCP, has been struggling to create a unique identity for its citizens 
that will enhance legitimization, trust, and normalization of its authoritarian communism. 
Traditionally, China has attempted to root this identity in well-known philosophical traditions, 
religions, and grandeur ideas of historical Chinese greatness. The CCP has placed a high priority 
on this idea of national identity as a means of legitimization, and has invested heavily into this 
through a slanted re-writing of history, biased interpretation of current events, and an over-
arching “China as the global victim” branding of its people. It is important to consider the CCP’s 
national identity, how it is rooted in philosophic traditions, and contradictions the party makes in 
this attempt. More recently, the CCP has become less ideologically based. Since the 1980s, it has 





of elites (Wang and Tadd, 2016, p. 237). Gewirtz offers concern for future sources of values in 
China: “The announced ideology of China’s Communist Party no longer seems to be a source of 
moral values for Chinese society. Indeed, it is no longer clear what that ideology really is” 
(Ivanhoe and Van Norden, 2016, p. 2). 
The method by which the CCP reinforces nationalism to the public is particularly 
intriguing. The antagonistic thrust of official nationalism in China was crystalized in the CCP’s 
rhetoric of “patriotism” (爱国主义). The ideology of patriotism, a corollary to national pride and 
sovereignty, centers around a history of Western antagonism and present hostility (Xu, 2000, p. 
121). Stratfor (2012) argues that Chinese nationalism is a “power instrument that temporarily 
shifts the public’s focus away from domestic and internal Party problems” by reinforcing the 
Party’s role as the guardian of China’s national sovereignty and honor. However, it has been 
demonstrated that the use of nationalism in China has expanded to shift focus away from foreign 
policy issues as well.  
 China has run into a foundational conundrum in offering contradictory explanations or 
sentiments in order to convey its policies. Rorty (1989) refers to this as a problem of “final 
vocabulary” (73). He states that all human beings carry about a set of words which they employ 
to justify their actions, their beliefs, and their lives… if doubt is cast upon the worth of these 
words, their user has no noncircular argumentative recourse (Rorty, 1989, p. 73). No person or 
organization is forced to speak any sentiment; the words that we choose are nothing but our own. 
Therefore, any contradictions are inherently a fault of logic, and could not reasonably be 





Authoritarian regimes in Asia have recently experimented with varying forms of political 
participation and deliberation. Beginning in the 1990s, the CCP introduced village-level 
elections, approval and recall at the local level, public hearings, deliberative polls, citizen rights 
to sue the state, moves to make government information public, and other political participatory 
innovations (He and Warren, 2011, p. 269). However, these practices are uneven in scope and 
effectiveness, and deliberations only focused on particular problems of governance (269). He and 
Warren (2011) point out that these practices are unique in an authoritarian government, and refer 
to these practices by an authoritarian regime with no apparent interest in regime-level 
democratization as “authoritarian deliberation” (269).  Scholars agree that this style of 
governance prioritizes the “top-level design” and discourages local responsiveness (Shambaugh, 
2015; Fewsmith and Nathan, 2019; Yang and Yan, 2019). 
He and Warren (2011) point out a key difference between democracies and regimes; 
democracy refers not to communication, but a distribution of powers of decision to those 
affected (272). Democracy allows empowerment through opportunities to vote for political 
representatives, to vote directly on policies, representative oversight and accountability, due 
process, etc. Deliberative authoritarianism is an ideal type of regime that combines concentrated 
power (power not distributed to the people) with deliberative communication. 
Chen (2004) asserts that the Chinese people have been bombarded with messages that 
“being patriotic and nationalistic” is to support the national government, along with Chinese 
norms and values (107). “Without the emphasis on historical memories, the Chinese people 
would not have been so easily spurred into taking action” (Wang, 2012, p. 199). Wang discusses 
the deep sense of historical victimization that the CCP has created within the Chinese people 





of current events from outside powers. In turn, these perceptions and sensitivities in times of 
crisis allow support for the CCP to act in an aggressive manner. Historical memory, in this sense, 









One of the most famous legal cases regarding the right to claim ownership of a territory 
took place in 1925 between the U.S. and the Netherlands, over the ownership of Palmas in the 
Indian Ocean. The U.S. assumed ownership of the island because Spain had succeeded the 
Philippines, and Palmas was assumed to be part of the island chain. However, an international 
arbitration panel ruled in favor of the Netherlands, based on effective occupation. The ruling set 
a precedent for necessity of occupancy and control over an area to establish sovereignty, 
regardless of first discovery or assumed ownership (Nielsen, 1928). The UN Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is the second legal framework that shaped the SCS dispute, and is the 
result of multiple conferences that took place between 1973-1982. This international law 
provided updates to arbitration and definitions regarding maritime sovereignty. Morton & 
Blackmore (2001) note that as technologies advanced during the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, states required a much larger buffer zone to protect their national interests (1236).  
Taiping Island (Itu Aba) in the SCS was first used by Chinese fishermen in the 1870s. In 
1932, France formally claimed the Paracel and Spratly Islands, and in 1933 seized and annexed 
them as a part of French Indochina. Japan rejected the claim, and annexed the island in 1938, 
making it a part of Taiwan (then also under Japanese rule).  Because of that administrative 
placement, Taiwan has occupied Taiping Island and the adjacent Zhongzhou Reef since 1956 
(Myers, 2018). Taiping Island is the only source of fresh water in the Spratly Island chain, which 





sustain habitation of its own, it should, by definition, be considered an island. (Focus Taiwan, 
2019). However, A PCA tribunal in 2016 ruled that the island was classified as a rock, rather 
than an island, and therefore not entitled to an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Both Taiwan 
and China rejected that ruling (PCA, 2016). 
Taiwan is in a particularly challenging position because of its unique relationship with 
China. Immediately following World War II (WWII), conflict between the nationalist 
Government of the Republic of China (ROC) and CCP erupted. The political unrest, began with 
the Chinese Revolution of 1911. Popular frustration mounted after the Japanese invasion of 
Manchuria, warlord insurrections, and undemocratic policies during WWII set the stage for 
resurgence of communist forces. After the Japanese surrender and failed talks between the two 
parties in 1945, China was in an all-out civil war by 1946. As the CCP had strong grassroots 
support and superior military organization and supplies (seized from the Japanese), the they 
ultimately declared victory in 1949. Mao Zedong proclaimed the establishment of the PRC in 
1949. However, early in 1947, the ROC Government had fled to Taiwan to regroup and plan to 
retake the mainland (U.S. State Department, 2016). To this day, Taiwan’s sovereignty is debated, 
whether it should be considered part of China or its own independent ROC. 
One of the earliest large-scale naval conflicts between China and Vietnam took place in 
1974 over the Paracel Islands (Xisha in Chinese, Hoang Sa in Vietnamese). In fact, the majority 
of conflicts in the SCS have occurred between China and Vietnam. Vietnamese and U.S. naval 
forces were observing two Chinese armored fishing trawlers near Drummond Island in January 
1974. The naval forces were supporting troops occupying the area. The Chinese vessels declined 
to leave after Saigon sent naval vessels to order the Chinese withdraw. Both sides refused to 





Chinese troops on Duncan Island. Chinese forces responded, and it ultimately ended with 
Vietnam’s defeat and China gained control over all of the Paracel Islands. Battles between China 
and Vietnam have continued, and as recently as 2012, Chinese vessels cut the cables to a 
commercial Vietnamese ship conducting tests forty-three miles southeast of Vietnam’s Quang 
Tri Province (Daniels, 2013).  
Relations between China and the Philippines were strained in 1994, after the Philippine 
government approved an oil exploration mission. The joint venture between U.S. and Philippine 
companies, were set to conduct oil exploration near the Reed Bank, northeast of the Spratly 
Islands. The Chinese saw this as a blatant infringement on their sovereignty. Chinese-built 
structures were discovered on Mischief Reef in 1995, further straining the China-Philippine 
relationship. Mischief Reef falls well within the Philippines-claimed EEZ. In response, the 
Filipino government used aerial surveillance to gain a better understanding of Chinese 
development on the island. They discovered war journalism platforms on stilts, each with three 
to four bunkers equipped with satellite communication equipment. The Philippines learned of 
further developments of Mischief Island in 1996, and even more structures appeared in Kota 
Islands, all of which fell within Philippine EEZ (Daniels, 2013, p. 10).  
In 1995, Taiwanese president Lee Teng-hui made an attempt at peaceful resolution to the 
SCS. He urged all claimants to the SCS should cancel individual claims, and invest in the SCS 
Development Company. This company would then develop projects within each of the 
respective countries, and avoid interstate conflict. The dispute continues because the states 






International Law and Maritime Disputes 
Traditionally, oceans have long been subject to the freedom-of-the-seas doctrine. This 
17th century principle limited national rights and jurisdiction over oceans to a narrow belt of sea 
surrounding a nation’s coastline (now known as EEZ). The remainder of the oceans were “free to 
all and belonging to none”. Growing concerns about coastal fish stocks rose in the twentieth 
century, as the secondary affects from fish populations and ship waste were realized. States’ 
rights to resources also came into question; whether a state owns the fish stocks, oil, minerals, or 
other natural resources in their respective EEZs. Growing demands for all of these resources 
heightened the tension between states and those who sought to gain from them. The U.S. set the 
precedent in 1945, unilaterally claiming all national resources in its EEZ. In the following years, 
several other states followed suit, laying claim to a 200-mile zone from their borders (UN, 1998).  
The UNCLOS establishes a 12-mile territorial limit for coastal states. Within this limit, a 
state could theoretically impose any law, and exploit and regulate any resource. During the 
creation stages of this measure of the UNCLOS, large debate existed between coastal states and 
states with major naval powers. Historically, coastal states followed the “cannon-shot” rule, 
meaning they could exercise sovereignty over roughly 3 nautical miles (NM). UNCLOS landed 
on the 12 NM limit, which effectively closed off over 100 straits traditionally used for 
international navigation. However, foreign warships were granted “innocent passage” through 
the waters, and “transient passage” to all other ships and vessels. Both of which simultaneously 
allowed states to retain sovereignty over the waters, while guaranteeing peaceful, unimpeded 
voyages (UN, 1998).  
The UNCLOS also created the EEZ to in response to the management and conservation 





EEZs. However, the EEZ also covers the right to exploit, develop, manage, and conserve all 
resources found in the waters, ocean floor, and subsoil of an area extending 200 NM form a 
coastal state’s shore. Since the creation of the EEZ, 86 coastal states have economic jurisdiction 
up to the 200 NM limit, and ninety-nine percent of the world’s fisheries fall under some nation’s 
jurisdiction (as opposed to international waters).  
The UNCLOS also addresses the extent of control states have over resources on their 
continental shelf. During the creation phase of this term, debate centered around whether to 
extend state control of resources to coincide with its EEZ. Articles 55-75 of UNCLOS state that 
the sovereign rights of a coastal State’s EEZ extends 200 NM from their baseline. However, it 
also states that the absolute limit, if including maritime areas where sovereignty is exercised, if 
350 NM from the state’s coast, dependent on the thickness of sedimentary deposits. Additionally, 
if a state extends its continental shelf, it must “contribute to a system of sharing revenue derived 
from the exploitation of resources beyond 200 NM” (UN, 1998).  
Finally, UNCLOS addresses the powers to govern, the settlement of cases, and member 
participation. In short, there is no universal participation, rather, rights are granted only to 
participating states. That said, states must “join the club” in order to enjoy its benefits. Only 
member states are granted the rights under UNCLOS, while all states still confirm existing 
customary law. Regarding the settlement of disputes, UNCLOS incorporated a mechanism to do 
so. Four options exist when direct talks between states fail: International Tribunal for the Law of 
the Sea, adjudication by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), submission to binding 
international arbitration procedures, or submission to special arbitration tribunals. The parties 
involved in the dispute are committed to the decision of any these four third-party settlements in 





We can expect that states will choose arbitration type based on the likelihood of 
achieving their desired result. The UNCLOS dispute resolution system offers arbitration for 
states that may encounter violations regarding the convention. Since 1994, states have made little 
use of the arbitration system: less than 25% to be exact (UN, 2017). UNCLOS offers 4 separate 
options that states must choose from in settling these types of disputes: The ICJ, the International 
Tribunal on the Law of Sea, private arbitration, or special tribunals convened to resolve unique 
scientific and environmental matters (Gates, 2017, p. 287). Powell and Wiegand (2014) maintain 
that “states are heavily influenced in their decision calculus by a political mechanism of their 
past experience with binding methods in resolving territorial disputes (363).   
Bateman (2011) labels the SCS a “wicked problem” for maritime security. Specifically, 
that states each hold differing interpretations of the Law of the Sea (p. 2). Conflicting 
sovereignty claims and management of the risk of greater regional naval activity is especially 
dangerous. There are essentially two ways for claimant states to manage these risks: building 
their own naval and air capabilities to protect their interests, and/or negotiating with their rivals 
(either bilaterally or through regional arrangements). (Bateman, 2011, p. 2). The following 
increase in military capabilities may give insight into which countries chose to take security into 
their own hands:  
Southeast Asian armed forces over the past decade have acquired “fourth generation” 
fighter aircraft, submarines, air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons, frigates, amphibious 
assault ships, anti-ship cruise missiles, and new command-control-communications-
computing-intelligence-surveillance-and-reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems. Arms imports 
to Indonesia and Malaysia have gone up 84% and 722%, respectively, between 2000 and 
2010. Vietnam has spent $2 billion on six state-of-the art Kilo-class Russian submarines 
and $1 billion on Russian jet fighters. Malaysia just opened a submarine base in Borneo. 
The Philippines committed $118 million in 2011 to purchase a naval patrol vessel and six 
helicopters to provide a security perimeter for a joint natural gas venture with Shell 
Philippines. Though primarily a land power, Thailand has considerable maritime 





acquired frigates from the U.S. and Britain, off shore patrol vessels (OPV) from China, 
and is negotiating with Germany for the purchase of refurbished submarines. Thailand 
participates in the Malaysia-Indonesia-Singapore “Eye in the Sky” component of the anti-
piracy Malacca Straits Patrols. That is, Thailand is now part of the littoral countries’ 
airborne anti-piracy surveillance of the Malacca Straits. Additionally, in September 2011 
Indonesia and Vietnam agreed to establish joint patrols on their maritime borders to 
improve their SCS monitoring capabilities. Indonesia’s EEZ overlaps China’s claim 
within the nine-dash line. (Simon, 2012, p. 998) 
ASEAN 
 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a multilateral organization with 
the goal of promoting economic growth, regional peace, and active collaboration among 
southeast Asian nations (ASEAN, 2020). As it relates to the SCS, ASEAN has become involved 
in promoting the peaceful development of SCS resources. The organization was established in 
1967, and has played an active role in maintaining peace in southeast Asia. Notably, it negotiated 
the 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the SCS among the claimants. At the time, ASEAN sought to 
form a code of conduct (COC) for its member states. Though it was not able to do so, the 
declaration was symptomatic of a trend towards adoption of norms in the regulation of SCS 
disputes (Buszynski, 2003). 
 In fact, ASEAN member states have been engaged in discussions on a potential COC for 
over two decades. The organization first endorsed the idea of a COC in 1996, but China and 
ASEAN settled for a nonbinding Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS in 2002 
(guidelines for which were not adopted until 2011). The declaration serves to reaffirm respect for 
freedom of navigation in and overflight above the SCS, undertake peaceful dispute resolution, 
undertake self-restraint in dispute conflict, and reaffirm adoption of a code of conduct in SCS to 
further promote peace (Nguyen, 2002). Some observers believe that China has been dragging out 
the COC negotiations, as part of a “talk and take” strategy (i.e. Beijing engages or prolongs 





YingHui, 2017, Thu, 2018). ASEAN states take varying positions on the SCS dispute: 
historically, Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar (Burma) lean toward China; Malaysia and Indonesia 
are cautious about U.S. involvement; Thailand and Singapore are neutral; and Vietnam and the 
Philippines welcome an increased American role (Bateman, 2011; Peiyaswamy, 2011).  
 
Figure 3.1: Overlapping Claims to the South China Sea 
 






•Claimed by: China and Vietnam
•Occupied by China
Paracel Islands
•Claimed by: China, Taiwan, Vietnam
•Partially claimed by: Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei
•Occupied by: China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia
Spratly Islands
•Claimed by: China, Taiwan, and the Philippines
•Occupied by: China
Scarborough Shoal







China, Taiwan, and Vietnam all claim the SCS in its entirety. Malaysia, Philippines, 
Indonesia, and Brunei, have asserted sovereignty only over islands that are near or fall within 
their boundaries, as recognized by international law. In the late 1940s, Chinese geographers 
produced a map that detailed its claims to the SCS. The map, known as the nine-dash line, 
includes all of the islands of the SCS and the island of Taiwan. New interpretations of 
international law have arguably affected China the most. Chinese claims are based solely on 
historical claims, which hold very little weight in international law. Chinese officials argue that 
their claim predates UNCLOS, and should be accommodated accordingly (Daniels, 2012, p. 8). 
Within ASEAN, the features claimed by Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei are also claimed 
by Vietnam. So, not only are these claimants arrayed against China, they are also arrayed against 
each other (Simon, 2012, p. 997).  
Taiwan’s claims to the SCS mirror those of China, and are based on historical claims. 
Taiwan has remained a marginal player in the dispute, but has been unsuccessful in its attempts 
to be included in multilateral mechanisms aimed at managing or resolving disputes, namely a 
code of conduct in the SCS. Because both China and Taiwan’s claims to the Spratly Islands and 
other parts of the SCS predate the Chinese Civil War, Taiwan’s claim to any part of the SCS is 
counterintuitive (Myers, 2018). Daniels (2012) asserts that Taiwan would be best served to, 
instead, bolster ties with regional powers. As Taiwan lacks the military resources to enforce SCS 
claims, it will remain a minor actor in the overall dispute (4-5).  
Vietnam claims the SCS in its entirety as well. Their historical claim is largely based on 
the Khanh Hoa Province. Hanoi considers the Spratly Islands to be a component of this 
Vietnamese province, and has established a government there. This tie was damaged after the 





wealth confiscated and redistributed, and some were required to move from cities to rural areas 
to support farming (Daniels, 2012, p. 4). This weakened Vietnam’s claim from the “effective 
occupation” precedent. 
The Philippines claim about fifty small islands in the SCS. Similar to the Japanese 
inheritance of the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea (ECS), the Philippine government was 
transferred the rights of the Kalayaan Island chain in 1974 from a private citizen. Thomas 
Cloma, a Filipino lawyer and businessman took ownership of the rocks after Japan renounced its 
ownership at the 1951 San Francisco peace Conference. Shortly after, in 1978, the Philippine 
government declared the islands a part of the Philippines (Storey, 1999, p. 96). However, the 
Tribunal found that all fixtures in the SCS were rocks, which directly challenges the rights of the 
Kalayaans. Similarly, Indonesia and Brunei are not looking to claim sovereignty over large 
swaths of land. Specifically, Indonesia claims only its already-established boundaries, including 
the Natuna Islands (Rosenburg, 2010). Indonesia’s submission is designed to foreclose any 
Chinese argument that China’s territorial waters include the rich fishery and seabed natural gas 
area north of Indonesia’s Natuna Islands (Simon, 2012, p. 998). Brunei is interested only in 
protecting its EEZ as afforded by UNCLOS (Ring, 2012).  
Malaysia claims only a small segment of the Spratly Islands, and maintains a small 
military presence there to enforce its claim. However, Malaysia has sought peaceful resolution 
through joint economic development plans for the SCS region (Rosenburg, 2010). Curiously, 
China is Malaysia’s biggest trading partner. Devadason (2009) points out that Malaysia is 
China’s third-biggest trading partner, trading more than any other ASEAN country (36-49). 
China and Malaysia’s trade ties have grown faster than any in the world, reaching a bilateral 





elevated their ties to a “comprehensive strategic partnership” (Fong, Ponnan, and De Rycker, 
2020, p. 41).  
                     Figure 3.2: Visualization of Claims and EEZs in South China Sea 
 





The International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) defines the SCS as “south of China, 
east of Vietnam, west of the Philippines, east of the Malay Peninsula and Sumatra, and north of 
Bangka Belitung Islands and Borneo (IHO, 1953). The waters include an archipelago of islands 
in the hundreds. The sovereignty of the waters is disputed by virtually all of its inhabitants, 
China referring to it as the SCS, Vietnam the East Sea, Philippines the West Philippine Sea 
(Official Gazette, 2012), and Indonesia the North Natuna Sea (Parameswaran, 2017). The 
majority of the ECS and SCS lies outside of the exclusive economic zone of mainland China. 
According to UN rules regarding EEZs, only parts of the Paracel Islands lie within the Chinese 
zone, leaving the rest of the SCS and ECS either within another country’s EEZ or international 
waters. 
Outside of economic opportunity, physical control the SCS offers the potential for 
regional dominance. Physical control of the waters equates to the control of every other aspect 
(political, economic, etc.). Key basing locations, along with naval and air operations would 
solidify control of key shipping lanes for nearly a dozen states. Theoretically, physical control 
could also allow for revenue streams from taxing any waterway movement. 
Beijing’s Key Activities in South China Sea 
Land Reclamation  
In late 2013, China doubled-down on its claims to the SCS by physically creating islands 
out of reefs. In short, these artificial islands were created by dredging millions of tons of rock 
and sand onto pre-existing reefs (Wingfield-Hayes, 2014). The new land is accompanied by a sea 
wall, and paved over with concrete. Referred to as the “great wall of sand” by Admiral Harris, 





artificial landmass in the SCS (Guardian, 2015). From 2013 to 2020, China created a total of 5 
square miles of new land mass (AMTI, 2020). Though construction of these artificial islands in 
the SCS began in late 2013, news of the construction did not break until 2015. This is largely due 
to the availability of information, as the only evidence is satellite imagery. There was likely 
military reporting on the topic immediately, but it wasn’t made publicly available until April 
2015 (BBC, 2015).   
According to satellite imagery from early 2016, China possibly started the construction of 
the second airstrip in the Paracel Islands at the North and Middle Islands (Lee, 2016a). This 
brings China’s combined total of known airstrips to five, in the disputed areas of the SCS at its 
disposal. Two airstrips were observed in the Paracel Islands (one at Woody Island and the new 
one at the North and Middle Islands) and two in the Spratly Islands (one at Fiery Cross Reef and 
another unfinished one at Subi Reef) (Lee, 2015d; Lee, 2016; AMTI, 2016). There is also one 
more recently confirmed at Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands (Tweed, 2018). 
In June 2015 China announced that the land reclamation in the SCS would end soon 
(MFA China 2015; BBC 2015). According to satellite imagery, the reclamation indeed finished 
in many of the posts in the Spratly Islands, but the construction work was actively continuing 
Lee, 2015d). Besides this, the reclamation works in the Paracel Islands also went on after this 
date (Lee 2015c). There were also signs that possible reclamation works began at Scarborough 
Shoal as well (Panda, 2016), but eventually, China withdrew from controlling the area and 
allowed the Filipino fishermen to enter. However, Chinese patrol vessels remained present in the 
vicinity (Mogato 2016; AP, 2016). 
Outside of the impact this has had on the territorial dispute, this has key impact on 





on the military upgrades documented on the islands. In a speech at the White House in 
September 2015, President Xi Jinping stated that he “did not intend to pursue militarization” of 
the SCS (White House, 2015). Fifteen months later, Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative 
(AMTI) released satellite imagery showing just that (Phillips, 2016). China occupies 20 outposts 
in the Paracel Islands, multiple naval harbors, helipads, airfields, and surface-to-air missiles 
(SAM). Specifically, China occupies seven sites in the Spratly Islands. It has engaged in island-
building and facility construction at almost all of these seven sites, particularly at Fiery Cross 
Reef, Subi Reef, and Mischief Reef. A 2018 overflight revealed that Subi Reef and Fiery Cross 
Reef were fortified with barracks, bunkers, radars, military runways, and army vehicles. There 
have been multiple reports of anti-aircraft and anti-ship missiles on these islands, as well as long-
range bomber refueling (Beech, 2018). 
Harassment/Violence  
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (2017) analyzed data from a list of 
all incidents that occurred in the SCS. Their data includes 70 incidents that occurred in the SCS 
between 2010 and 2017, and are coded for the type of incident, which states were involved, and 
the outcome of the event. The purpose of their analysis is to consider whether maritime law 
enforcement forces in the region are destabilizing. “In recent years, many of these countries have 
mobilized government vessels traditionally used for maritime law enforcement to reinforce their 
territorial claims. Key among these states is China, which has actively employed its coast guard 
and other maritime law enforcement agencies to project power and assert sovereignty throughout 
the SCS” (China Power Project, 2016). 
Beginning in early 2012, Chinese ships have expelled, detained, and detained, and 





officials arrested 21 Vietnamese fishermen for illegal fishing. They asked for CNY 70,000 (USD 
$11,199) each for the release of the crewmen. The detention sparked strong protest from 
Vietnam, which asserts this action as a violation of their sovereignty. Vietnam also argues that 
according to UNCLOS Article 73, “coastal state penalties for violations of fisheries laws and 
regulations in the exclusive economic zone may not include imprisonment, in the absence of 
agreements to the contrary by the states concerned, or any other form of corporal punishment” 
(Vietnam News, 2012) China continues to assert its sovereignty in the ECS, claiming that nearly 
80% of Hoang Sa (Paracel Islands) falls within its territory. Chinese sources reported the 
incident as illegal because the fishermen were “bomb fishing”. The ransom was reported as a 
fine for illegal fishing according to Chinese laws (Xinhua, 2012).  
In April 2012, Chinese fishing vessels were spotted in a lagoon near Scarborough Shoal. 
The news of the Shoal dispute was the first of many that brought global attention to the overall 
SCS disputes. In short, the Philippine Navy accused China of illegal fishing within Bajo de 
Masinloc’s (Scarborough) EEZ. As a result, the Philippines elected to bring the dispute to the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). Chinese officials rejected the claim, 
affirming that the Shoal as “inherent territory on which we have sufficient legal basis” 
(Philippine Daily, 2012). Aside from the debate over the territory itself, China chose to use this 
incident shines a light on whether the UN is the appropriate arbitrator in these maritime disputes. 
In June 2012, ties between China and Vietnam are again heightened, as Vietnam declares 
sovereignty over both the Spratly and Paracel Islands. In response, China raised the 
administrative status of islands in the Spratly and Paracel archipelagos to “prefecture” and 
announced the city responsible for administering them. China National Offshore Oil Corporation 





and gas companies to explore. Even though the blocked area lies entirely within Vietnam’s EEZ 
according to UNCLOS, the enormous estimations of natural resources in this specific area makes 
the dispute more valuable. This value is exponential, given that China’s oil consumption 
increased more than 23% between 2009 and 2012 (CEIC, 2018).  
In December 2012, Japan detained a Chinese fishing boat within Japanese waters in the 
ECS. China has been increasing its maritime surveillance vessel patrols in the contested water 
with Japan, in an effort to prove its freedom of movement. That same month, two naval 
destroyers, along with nine other ex-navy vessels were transferred to the Chinese maritime 
surveillance fleet (Al Jazeera, 2012). This move underscores China Marine Surveillance’s 
commitment to “protecting China's interests and executing law enforcement missions”, and more 
importantly, the strategic importance Chinese leadership placed on the ECS dispute with Japan. 
There have also been reports of Chinese overflights in the ECS, which have not been observed 
since at least 1958 (AFP, 2012). 
China’s establishment of an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the East China 
Sea may be the most assertive move made throughout the entirety of these regional disputes. 
ADIZs are designated air zones that restrict all aircraft movement. These zones, similar to naval 
blockades, are meant to establish and maintain air dominance over an area. Though typically 
played by governments as a safety restriction, they are often meant to deny an adversary 
overflight or strategic advantage from the air (Johnson, 2017). This case is no different; as Japan 
and the U.S. have an interest in asserting their freedom of navigation in these regions, this ADIZ 
served as a physical dedication to asserting its sovereignty claims to the ECS. The ADIZ covered 





announced that any aircraft entering the zone are required to submit flight plans of “face 
defensive emergency measures” (New Zealand Herald, 2013).  
In May 2014, state-owned China Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOC) moved an oil rig to 
the SCS, near the Paracel Islands. This move, known as the Zhongjiannan Project, was prompted 
by the potential for oil and gas in the region. The rig’s drilling operation only lasted 2 months, as 
a preliminary collection to analyze the natural resources in the area. China Coast Guard, Navy, 
and civilian fishing ships accompanied the rig, which were soon met by Vietnamese Coast Guard 
and Fisheries Resources Surveillance (VFRS). Chinese ships formed a “protective ring” to head 
off the incoming ships, creating a 3 NM perimeter. By mid-May, drilling had begun and the 
perimeter expanded to 15 NM (CSIS, 2017). This project sparked violent riots within Vietnam, 
prompting the evacuation of thousands of Chinese nationals (Armstrong, 2014). The company 
asserted the territorial claims, stating that “a third of China’s oil and gas resources are under the 
SCS” (Li, 2014).    
The U.S. regularly flies and sails within international waters, including the SCS and ECS, 
to exercise freedom of navigation (FON). In 2 separate incidents, in 2014 and 2016, Chinese 
fighter jets intercepted U.S. aircraft flying said FON missions. The 2014 incident included 
acrobatic maneuvers around the U.S. plane, in order to reveal the weaponry onboard the Chinese 
aircraft in a show of force. The 2016 event was characterized as unsafe, as 2 Chinese J-11 fighter 
jets flew within 50 feet of the U.S. aircraft several times (Mogato, 2016). The intercept took 
place about 135 miles east of Hainan Island, the southernmost province of mainland China (Lyle, 
2014). 
Numerous headlines have included the SCS since the 1970s, including the Paracel Islands 





early 2000s, frictions were reduced as China became more open to reassuring ASEAN 
counterparts of its peaceful approach to SCS disagreements (Glaser, 2011). In fact, the Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in 2003 signaled a significant breakthrough for peace between 
China, the Philippines, and Vietnam over the disputes. The follow-on treaty in 2005 created even 
more hope as it restrained any provocative moves from regional actors (Glaser, 2011).  
External Intervention 
The core of the SCS sovereignty dispute lies within defining from where an EEZ can be 
derived. Articles 55-75 of UNCLOS state that the sovereign rights of a coastal State’s EEZ 
extends 200 NM from their baseline. However, it also states that the absolute limit, if including 
maritime areas where sovereignty is exercised, if 350 NM from the state’s coast. All of which 
hinges on the assumption that China if defined as a coastal state to the SCS. The fact that 
mainland China is 550 NM from the limits of the nine-dash line makes the claim even less 
plausible (Zimmerman and Baumler, 2013). Indonesia directly challenged China’s claim in 2009, 
stating that all features in the SCS are rocks, not islands, therefore, may not claim a 200 NM 
territorial sea claim. UNCLOS states that only islands are entitled to a 200 NM EEZ (as well as a 
territorial sea, contiguous zone, and continental shelf (Keating, 2018)). The difference between a 
rock and an island is that the latter is “capable of sustaining human habitation or economic 
activity” (Simon, 2012).    
In 2002, China agreed to take part in a multi-lateral forum with ASEAN. ASEAN is a 
multinational organization focused on promoting stability in among its state members. ASEAN 
and China issued the “Declaration on the conduct of parties in the SCS”, in a move toward 
promoting China’s “peaceful development” approach to dispute resolution. However, in 2005, 





Chinese Navy opened fire on a Vietnamese fishing boat near the Paracel Islands, killing 8 
fishermen (CSIS, 2017). It is unclear the real effect ASEAN will have in deterring Beijing from 
any further aggression. 
To help answer these questions of sovereignty, The UN PCA rendered its response on the 
SCS Arbitration Tribunal. The tribunal found that China’s claim to historic rights to the SCS 
(nine-dash line) were “incompatible with the EEZs provided” (PCA, 2016). In other words, the 
claims did not trump the Philippines’ inherent sovereignty. The Tribunal also found that Chinese 
actions in the SCS (interfering with Philippine fishing, constructing islands, and allowing 
Chinese fishing) violated Philippine sovereignty. It added that Chinese law enforcement had 
“unlawfully created risk of collision” by obstructing Philippine vessels. The Tribunal found that 
China’s land reclamation, island building, and allowing of illegal fishing caused severe harm to 
the coral reef, and violated China’s obligation to preserve fragile ecosystems (PCA, 2016).  
In fact, the Tribunal found that none of the features in the Spratly Islands (in their natural 
condition) are capable of sustaining human habitation or economic life of their own. In other 
words, the geographic features are not considered islands, and do not generate their own EEZ or 
CS (Keating, 2018). Swaine (2016) highlights that in no instance did the Philippines explicitly 
ask for the tribunal to rule on whether China, the Philippines, or some other state holds or should 
hold sovereignty over any of the geological features or maritime zones of the SCS (p. 51). The 
argument that UNCLOS has no authority to make such judgements would, in fact, be valid.  
Chinese officials and media outlets made abundantly clear that China will “neither accept 
nor participate in arbitration unilaterally initiated by the Philippines” (CSIL, 2011). In response 
to the Tribunal, Beijing released another White Paper in 2014, restating its position that it did not 





jurisdiction to determine sovereignty over maritime features, the Philippines had previously 
agreed to a settlement, and the subject of the dispute excluded China from compulsory 
arbitration; “China believes that the nature and maritime entitlements of certain maritime 
features in the SCS cannot be considered in isolation from the issue of sovereignty” (MFA, 
2014). However, UNCLOS authorizes arbitral proceedings to continue even if “one of the parties 
to the dispute does not appear before the arbitral tribunal or fails to defend its case” (UNCLOS, 
1982).  
Chinese officials assert that the Tribunal lacks the authority and jurisdiction to arbitrate 
this case (MFA, 2014a). Officials have also asserted that Manila had to right to seek third-party 
involvement, as it violated international legal norm pacta sunt servanda (“agreements must be 
kept”) (CCTV, 2016).  In fact, Beijing initiated a media campaign to discredit the ruling 
immediately after the decision was made. Specifically, it asserts the Tribunal’s “one-sidedness” 
and reaffirms its view that the Philippines has illegally occupied Chinese territory (Yang, 2015). 
Chinese officials likely expected the Tribunal to reach the ruling that it did, and this campaign 
was the most convenient way to embrace the impact it made on their perspective of the disputes.  
Strategic Goals and Official Protests 
China’s entire economic security is heavily reliant on the SCS (SCS). More than 60 
percent of China’s trade (in value) traveling by sea (China Power Project, 2020a). The SCS alone 
carries one-third of all global shipping, an estimated $3.37 trillion annually (CFR, 2019). There 
is also an estimated 11 billion barrels in oil in the SCS, along with 190 trillion cubic feet in 
natural gas resources (CFR, 2019). Over 50% of all fishing vessels are estimated to operate in the 
SCS (Poling, 2020). Regional players have an ever-increasing energy dependency has 





Vietnam all had record growth rates of energy consumption between 2005-2015 (Dan, 2018). 
Without question, control of this area is directly related to the balance of regional economies.  
China’s claims to geographic features in the SCS are the most extensive and ambiguous. 
Rather than disputing individual features and their adjacent waters, Beijing insists on ownership 
of the entirety of the SCS. Chinese officials view these areas as critical to national interests, and 
has increasingly attempted to assert its sovereignty over them (Rosenberg, 2010). Chinese 
officials first identified the defense of claims in the SCS as a “core interest” in 2010 (U.S. State 
Department, 2010). U.S. newspapers announced the developments taken from a private meeting 
in Beijing with U.S. officials (Wong, 2011).  
…what is considered an internal domestic Chinese issue in Chinese debate may include 
territories that others might think are not Chinese at all. Crucially, though, if they are 
deemed by China to be in China, then there is no leeway for any discussion or negotiation 
with others: territorial integrity is a bottom-line non-negotiable interest (Zeng, Xiao, and 
Breslin, 2015, p. 260). 
This is critical to understanding Beijing’s approach to the SCS debate, demonstrating that Xi 
Jinping himself has placed Chinese core interests as a top priority for the state: “No foreign 
country should expect China to trade off with our core national interests… which include 
sovereignty, security, and development interests” (People’s Daily, 2013). This overt dedication 
to SCS claims highlights the shift in national strategy from a peaceful approach to a more 
assertive perspective to achieving its goals.   
There has been serious academic debate surrounding just what China’s core interests are 
(Campbell, Meick, Hsu, & Murray, 2013).  Prior to 2011, Chinese core interests fell under Dai’s 
definition: ‘to maintain China’s fundamental system and state security; state sovereignty and 
territorial integrity; and the continued stable development of the economy and society’ (Qiang, 





sovereignty, national security, territorial integrity and national reunification, Constitutional 
political system, and safeguards for sustainable economic and social development (Chinese State 
Council, 2011). Interpretation of either definition is key, as SCS claims could fall under one or 
multiple of the above categories, or none. There has also been debate over whether SCS is a 
domestic issue or a foreign policy issue (Zeng, Xiao, and Breslin, 2015). Because the SCS is not 
clearly identified in either definition (Chinese State Council, 2011), we must consider official 
rhetoric, historic stances, and response to similar disputes as they relate to Chinese core interests.  
The Chinese position on the SCS issue can be understood as the following: 1. China does 
not participate in the arbitration, nor accept, recognize, or implement the award. 2. China will 
adhere to peaceful negotiations and settlements of the SCS dispute. 3. While disputes should be 
settled by the parties directly concerned in accordance with the Declaration on the Conduct of 
Parties in the SCS, China will work with ASEAN countries to maintain peace and stability in this 
region. 4. The temporally established (ad hoc) arbitral tribunal is neither a part of the PCA nor 
the ICJ. It does not have jurisdiction over the territorial disputes, which is the core of the 
arbitration. The arbitration itself is flawed in procedure. Thus, the award is not legally-binding, 
nor representing international law (MFA, 2016; Wang & Chen, 2016). 
In May 2009, Beijing submitted a map with nine dashed lines, which based this claim on 
historical discovery and use. These maps, first drawn up in the 1940s, are based on historical 
evidence from nearly two thousand years ago, which include the Spratly Islands as a part of 
Chinese territory. The nine-dash line is a term used by Chinese media to represent their historic 
claim to the SCS. The claim is a U-shaped line enclosing most of the waters of the SCS. The 
CCP defended its claim and coined the new phrase: “not one [dash] less”. The term was first 





authenticity in historical evidence, such as pottery shards, navigational handbooks, and other 
ancient archeological pieces (Beech, 2016). Though the term “nine dash line” was historically 
rarely found in Chinese media, it was acknowledged immediately after the PCA Tribunal 
(Beech, 2016). In fact, Chinese media referenced the term a record number of times in 2016, 
immediately after the tribunal. Specifically, 37% of all references to the nine-dash line by 
Chinese media sources took place in 20161. 
Chinese media have been critical of foreign media on the SCS issue. In February 2018, 
the Global Times cited a Chinese researcher; "Most of the construction on islands in the SCS 
were completed in 2015 and the pace then slowed. Civilian facility construction is the major 
focus of the SCS islands building and the portion of defense deployment is relatively small” 
(Zhao, 2018). This narrative of civil use of the islands is intended to counter external observers’ 
so-called narratives of China’s military buildup on various islands in the SCS. In fact, the 
People’s Daily calls the actions of the Group of Seven (G7) hypocritical and irresponsible: 
“These countries have made groundless accusations against China…These countries are in no 
position to blame China in the name of international law” (People’s Daily Online, 2018).  
 Regarding the SCS, we must consider how the maritime disputes fir into China’s overall 
diplomatic aims and how they fit into the larger picture. Zhou (2016) finds that the relative 
importance of the SCS disputes are fluid, and dependent on military conflict. If China and the 
other countries in question were able to shelve the disputes, the issue would slip to a low rank on 
China’s foreign policy agenda. However, if the disputes threatened to provoke military conflict, 
and thereby to affect the stability of the overall neighborhood environment they would move 
                                                             
1 Percentage generated by a Factiva search of “nine dash l ine” by sources originating in China with no date 





rapidly up to the top of the Chinese foreign policy agenda (p. 873). Yan (2013) finds that 
between 2011 and 2014, Chinese foreign policy transitioned from ‘keeping a low profile’ to 
‘striving for achievement’ (pp 15-6), suggesting a change in the status and ranking of SCS 



















Chapter 4: News and the Price of Islands in 
China 
 
Nationalism and China’s South China Sea Foreign Policy  
Prior to 1990, the public was primarily focused on domestic issues, as China was 
undergoing far-reaching economic reforms. However, after 1995, the interest started to shift 
towards international issues, along with emerging nationalistic attitudes (Repnikova, 2014). This 
shift in Chinese attitude toward its domestic audience may be a response to its increased 
occurrences of “mass incidents”. A Chinese sociologist notes that in 2010, there were an 
estimated 180,000 demonstrations of social unrest, a three-fold increase from 2003 (Shu, 2012). 
Tsang (2019) asserts that Innenpolitk theories best describe this phenomenon (305). Innenpolitik 
theories argue that internal factors such as political and economic ideology, national character, 
partisan politics, or socioeconomic structure determine how countries behave toward other 
countries (Rose, 1998, p. 148). Tsang (2019) narrows his focus on the political system to better 
understand this relationship between the CCP and its domestic audience. He asserts a unique 
party-state realism for understanding how Chinese policy makers approach foreign policy.  
Gries (2002) explores multiple examples of international incidents and how the CCP 
modified their narrative to fit the nationalist objective to best support China’s response to each 
incident. Regarding information control, however, China is moving away from suppression, and 
more toward co-optation (121). In other words, nationalist sentiment is now so engrained into the 
Chinese perspective, that it is organically emerging. Popular nationalist movements now allow 





Similarly, Briscoe (2000) observes the methods the CCP use to promote Chinese culture and 
“Chinese dignity” in the international community, as a claim to nationalist identity.     
Chubb (2018) addresses the link between public opinion and assertive maritime behavior 
in the SCS. He examines nationalist social phenomena that are “capable of generating pressure 
for confrontational state actions on issues”, particularly in the SCS and ECS (Chubb, 2018, p. 
160). In his examination of three events between 2006 and 2014, he found little evidence to 
suggest a link between China’s on-water assertiveness and popular nationalism. One of the three 
events he used for analysis is the 2009 U.S. Naval Ship (USNS) Impeccable incident. Chubb 
(2019) concludes that because Chinese news sources did not cover the incident within the month 
of the incident, that CCP leadership was unconcerned with “nationalist credentials among the 
public via the assertive actions it had taken” (167). This conclusion could be discounted if the 
approach to which Beijing uses to bolster nationalist credentials is reexamined.  
Following the model of domestic public opinion driving foreign policy, Medcalf and 
Heinrichs (2011) suggest that assertive Chinese behavior at sea may be “intended as a 
demonstration of naval capacity to Chinese audiences, designed to reinforce the status of China’s 
leadership and military as defenders of sovereignty” (21). Chubb (2018) examined the 
relationship between public opinion and changes to China’s on-water policies between 2006 and 
2012, however was unable to find any real causal link (161-174). However, Chubb (2018) notes 
that “PRC officials frequently claim to be constrained or pressured by their nationalist citizenry, 
but such claims are often either reflexively dismissed or silently accepted, rather than followed 
up and discussed in depth” (174).     
Lai (2010) notes China’s unique approach to foreign policy, in its centrality of domestic 





driver of Chinese foreign policy is domestic (Tsang, 2020, p. 305). In a 2018 speech addressing 
the CCP’s Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs, Xi Jinping highlighted the 
importance of considering both domestic and international factors while “focusing on realizing 
Chinese nation's rejuvenation and promoting human progress” (MFA, 2018).  CCP senior 
leadership have come to the conclusion “that conducting external work requires taking into 
account both domestic and international situations” (MFA, 2018). Xi Jinping concludes be 
reasserting that Chinese diplomats must “uphold the authority of the CPC Central Committee as 
the overarching principle and strengthen the centralized, unified leadership of the Party on 
external work” (MFA, 2018). Though domestic politics may not overwhelmingly explain 
Chinese foreign policy, it most certainly affects foreign policy more than previous theoretical 
explanations have assumed. 
Security Dilemma 
The security dilemma that realism assumes is the ultimate driving factor to states’ 
decisions, and this is particularly evident in the case of the SCS. The standard realist view is that 
China’s growing strength will lead it to pursue its interests more assertively. This increased 
assertiveness will lead the U.S. and other regional powers to balance against it. Adherents of the 
realist perspective view Chinese increased assertiveness in the SCS and ECS, and alignment of 
the U.S., India, and other regional powers as signs that the realist “assertiveness-balancing” cycle 
has already begun (Glaser, 2011, p. 81). The “China debate” was most prevalent immediately 
following the Cold War. In the early 1990s, the American economy was suffering, as China’s 
economy and military spending was growing quickly (Christensen, 2001, p. 6). Christensen 





matters, and what matters in power is one’s relative capabilities compared with those of others 
(p. 6).   
Though outside of the bounds of the SCS issue, the China security dilemma has been 
similarly described in this way:  
Even if one does not accept the view that the PRC’s goal is to displace the United States 
as East Asia’s preponderant power, it is still possible to reach fairly pessimistic 
conclusions about the likely future character of the U.S.-China relationship by invoking 
the mechanism of the security dilemma. In other words, even if the larger political goals 
of both sides are, in some sense, purely defensive, the measures that each takes to secure 
its position and achieve its objectives may still arouse alarm and stimulate 
countermeasures on the other side. Such processes appear to be at work in several aspects 
of contemporary U.S.-China relations. (Friedberg, 2005, p. 22) 
 Allison (2015) argues the increased likelihood of a U.S.-Chinese conflict, better known 
as a “Thucydides trap”. The Thucydides trap is an important metaphor that captures the 
application of standard realist understanding of the SCS. This Greek metaphor represents the 
attendant dangers when rising power rivals a ruling power; in 12 of 16 cases over the past 500 
years, the result was war (Allison, 2015). Xi Jinping himself denies the existence of the concept, 
and warned of the dangers of becoming victims of hearsay not based on fact. Curiously, he also 
warned that “should major countries time and again make the mistakes of strategic 
miscalculation, they might create such traps for themselves.” (China Daily, 2015).  
It is worth noting that the Thucydides’s trap argument has been criticized by multiple 
scholars (Chan, 2020, p. 28-46; Waldron, 2017) for its incompatibility, both from the analytical 
and historical perspectives. Allison’s (2015) argument stems from Organski and Kugler’s (1980) 
argument addressing the relationship between rising powers and war. However, it takes a stark 
deviation from the original argument. The neoclassical realism argument better describes the 





that a state’s actions are a function of domestic politics. Neoclassical realism is the most 
appropriate response to the modern factors that influence decision making in China, and serves 
as the contemporized version of realist theoretical framing.  
The CCP’s use of militant nationalism, its cultivation of historic claims and grievances 
against foreign powers, and its rejection of the idea of universal human values are all essential to 
its mobilization of popular support and bolstering its legitimacy (Friedberg, 2018, p. 8). As the 
CCP is insecure about its legitimacy, its leadership believe that the stronger the country appears 
abroad, the stronger the regime will be at home (Friedberg, 2018, p.18). Appeals to patriotism, 
nationalism, and cultural pride as a means to legitimize or generate support is by no means 
unique to the CCP. However, Joseph (2014) asserts that the CCP’s nationalist appeals, 
particularly the “China Dream”, may lead to a more aggressive foreign policy or military policy 
in order to enhance its image among its citizens (186). 
Assertive or Not? Theories of Assertiveness in South China Sea 
 Scholars have also theorized that policy adjustments on the part of China since the end of 
the 2000s is related to external threat perception.  Swaine (2015) found extensive Chinese media 
reporting on U.S. activity in East Asia at the end of 2011 and early 2012 (p. 4). Wang and Yin 
(2013) found that from 2009 to 2011, the most popular label to describe this renewed U.S. 
interest in the region was ‘returning to Asia’. Curiously, ‘pivot to Asia’ received almost no 
attention in 2011 and only minor attention in 2012. At the same time, in 2012 ‘strategic 
rebalancing to Asia’ was the most popular phrase in the Chinese media for describing the 
American policies in the region. However, 2011 saw more than twice as many articles featuring 
one of the three labels than any other year (Wang and Yin, 2013, p. 5). The U.S. policy of ‘pivot 





related to China’s growing power (Chen, 2013; Saunders, 2014; Swaine, 2015; Wang and Yin, 
2013; Zhu, 2012).  
CSIS’s China Power project identified 53 separate incidents (between 2010 and 2019) in 
which Beijing harassed foreign entities in the SCS. The project compiles and codes all incidents 
into the following categories according to outcome: arrest, death, harassment, official protest, 
ramming, shots fires, standoff, and water cannon. For the purposes of this data, China Power 
(2020) defines “harassment” as “aggressive behavior directed at individuals or equipment”. 
Actors include the Peoples’ Armed Police (PAP) and the China Coast Guard (which includes 
China Maritime Surveillance, China Fisheries Law Enforcement, Maritime Police and Border 
Patrol, and Maritime Anti-smuggling Police). China Maritime Surveillance (CMS) is referred to 
as China’s “second navy”, which has recently been recognized as the world’s largest blue-water 
coast guard fleet (Martinson, 2015). Figure 4.1 illustrates the data collected, with a peak of 
harassment events taking place in 2015. This data suggests that Chinese foreign policy became 













Figure 4.1: Visualization of Harassment Incidents (2010-2019) 
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 Turcsányi (2018) attempts to explain whether the assertive behavior of China since 2011 
has been driven by a power shift (142). His analysis examines the ‘power shift’ theory, 
answering whether China only conducted assertive action in the SCS after acquiring the power to 
do so. His research examines five established incidents of Chinese assertive action in the SCS: 
cable-cutting incidents (2011-2012), the Scarborough Shoal stand-off (2012), The Second 
Thomas Shoal stand-off (2013), the oil rig incident (2014), and land reclamation, construction, 
and militarization of the SCS outposts (since 2014) (Turcsányi, 2018, p. 143). Ultimately, there 
was little evidence to suggest this theory applied to the SCS, as most of the steps which China 
took recently were within its capacity for years, and perhaps decades beforehand (Turcsányi, 
2018, p. 144).  
 Of the five assertive actions that Turcsányi (2018) used to conduct analysis of explaining 
assertiveness, he found that all but one of these incidents were “reactive assertiveness”. 
Turcsányi (2018) asserts that each of the events were simply rational reactive actions taken in 
response to an external actor first performing a provocative action (p. 153). He found that in each 
of these incidents, the actions of external actors played the role of the immediate trigger for the 
Chinese policies. For instance, regarding the cable-cutting incidents, he found this to be ‘reactive 
assertiveness’ because other countries were conducting surveys within China’s nine-dash line 
(Turcsányi, 2018, p. 153). However, there are flaws in the explanatory evidence he uses to reach 
these conclusions. This may be the reasoning that Chinese leaders use to reach their decision, but 
it is not an objective account for concluding the event is reactive.   
Ratha (2019) argues that China’s assertiveness is the manifestation of its reactions to 
other states’ actions, growing nationalistic forces and its utter necessity to acquire natural 





assumed and restated without sufficient description and analysis. Little objective analysis has 
been conducted on Chinese behavior after 2011, from the perspective of the ‘assertiveness’ 
concept (Turcsányi, 2018, p. 11). Most analysis discussing Chinese assertiveness to date all 
focus on when the actual policy change towards a more assertive Chinese posture allegedly 
occurred—2009-2010. Post-2011 assertiveness may not be studied as much because Chinese 
policies have become undisputedly assertive since then. In fact, Turcsanyi (2018) found that 
China’s assertive behavior in the SCS between 2011 and 2016 unequivocal (43, 53).  The 
following study counters Johnston’s (2013) interpretation of the effect of Chinese nationalism on 
foreign policy since 2010, under Turcsanyi’s definition of ‘prime’ Chinese assertiveness in the 
SCS to date.  
Methodology for Content Analysis 
 This content analysis measures the effect of Chinese media on its domestic foreign 
audience. Specifically, this study examines Chinese newspaper coverage of five established 
assertive incidents in the SCS. Each of the events occurred between 2011 and 2016, immediately 
following China’s declaration of the SCS as a national core interest (U.S. State Department, 
2010). This research analyzes Xinhua News Agency, China Daily, Global Times, and People’s 
Daily, and their framing of the five incidents. The purpose of this research is to explore how 
Chinese state media regulates the flow of information following assertive foreign policy actions. 
 The Factiva database was utilized in order to create an all-inclusive sample of 
publications. Factiva is a research tool that aggregates content from thousands of news sources 
(Factiva, 2020). Table 4.3 identifies the keywords used to identify related articles about each of 
the five events, and specific date ranges used to filter each. Articles that reported on one of the 





scholars have noted a decreasing amount of freedom of media in Hong Kong (Lee & Chan, 2018, 
p. 49; Maheshwarl, 2014, p. 190), suggesting the increased role of CCP influence. The date of 
publication is also key in understanding how the CCP presents foreign policy information to its 
domestic audience. As such, this research also examines the publication date, as it relates to the 
date that each event occurred. Of the 99 articles examined, the average news story was published 
490 days after the event took place (n=5).  
Selected Events 
The first of the five actions are the cable-cutting incidents between 2011 and 2012. 
During this time period, Chinese vessels cut cables on Vietnamese seismic survey vessels, in an 
attempt to continue disrupting its oil-related activities (Hayton, 2014, p. 144, 253). The first case 
took place on May 26, 2011, as three Chinese paramilitary ships severed the cable of a 
Vietnamese survey ship, with another two similar instances also occurring in 2011. The Vietnam 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2011) also reported similar instances in 2011, involving Philippine 
and Malaysian research vessels. Similarly, Page (2012) found further cable-cutting incidents in 
2012 involving Vietnamese vessels. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) denies any 
wrongdoing, and found the research vessels as being in grave violation of Chinese sovereignty 
and maritime rights (BBC, 2011). Turcsányi (2018) found the incident assertive, as it was 
qualitatively different and much bolder than any other policy in the years before (p. 46).  
 The next incident selected is the Scarborough Shoal standoff of 2012. The incident 
occurred on April 10, 2012, when Chinese fishing boats were spotted in the waters by Filipino 
reconnaissance planes (Zachrisen 2015, pp. 85–86). The crew of the Philippines’ Gregorio del 
Pilar, the biggest warship of its navy, allegedly inspected the boats and discovered protected 





from doing so by accompanying Chinese surveillance vessels. Alternatively, China claims that 
the Chinese fishermen tried to take shelter in the shoal during harsh weather. The Philippine 
naval boat blocked the entrance to the lagoon and harassed them. The Chinese surveillance 
vessels were then sent to protect the fishermen (China Daily, 2012; People’s Daily Online, 
2012). 
 An important aspect of the 2012 Scarborough Shoal standoff was the increasing pressure 
China placed on the Philippines during the incident. China never sent in its military, but the most 
advanced and armed law enforcement ships were present. At one point, there were allegedly 90 
Chinese vessels facing only two ships of the Philippines (Goldman, 2013, p. 6). What’s more, 
China was steadily increasing its diplomatic pressure on the Philippines by repeatedly 
summoning its ambassador in Beijing, which was accompanied by editorials mentioning a 
potential for war between the countries (China Daily, 2012). The Chinese pressure on the 
Philippines can then be regarded as assertive by the number of vessels, the level of diplomatic 
and media pressure, and finally the application of economic sanctions (Turcsányi, 2018, p. 47).  
 The third selected event is the Second Thomas Shoal incident, which has been ongoing 
since 2013. Similar to the Scarborough Shoal incident of 2013, this incident took place near 
Mischief Island between China and the Philippines. Since 1999, the Philippines have continually 
maintained a presence of marines on the Sierra Madre, a ship run aground. In May 2013, 
Chinese fishermen and enforcement vessels blocked the restocking of supplies to the marines on 
the Sierra Madre (Glaser and Szalwinski 2013). The controversy surrounding the defense of the 
blockade was whether the Philippines were providing reconstruction materials to the Sierra 





trigger of the blockade, along with the longevity of the blockade itself, is sufficient to classify it 
as assertive (Turcsányi, 2018, p. 47). 
 On May 2, 2014, China moved the Haiyang Shiyou 981, a commercial oil rig, to the 
disputed waters near the Paracel Islands that fell within Vietnam’s EEZ (Bower and Poling 
2014). Immediately after, approximately 30 Vietnamese boats tried to intervene, but they were 
prevented from doing so by more than 80 vessels of the China Coast Guard. During the 
operation, a few Vietnamese personnel were injured and detained. The oil rig remained on the 
spot until July 16, 2014, although it was initially scheduled to remain there until 15 August 
(Leaf, 2015). China argued that its mission was successfully achieved earlier (Thayer, 2014), 
although an alternative explanation was that it was due to an upcoming typhoon (Guardian, 
2014). A year later, in 2015, China redeployed the oil rig near the Paracel Islands, although this 
time it was within China’s undisputed waters and closer to China’s coast (Panda 2015; see also 
SCS Think Tank, 2016).  
 The oil rig incident is different to the incidents at the Scarborough and Second Thomas 
Shoals. The issue was initiated by China, and even though China naturally views its activities as 
legitimate, it played some role in its diplomatic, media, and public reactions. China claimed that 
it had rights to the waters due to its sovereignty over the Paracel Islands and its EEZ. The 
incident was the first time that China started drilling oil from disputed waters using an oil rig, 
although still not commercially and only on a temporary basis (Thayer, 2014). From this 
perspective, it is clear that the Chinese step was unprovoked and markedly different to any 
previous behavior of China or any other actor in the region. The Chinese behavior in this case 





The final event encompasses the land reclamation, construction, and militarization of 
SCS outposts since 2014.  Since 2014, China engaged in massive reclamation projects and the 
construction of artificial islands in at least seven locations in the Spratly Islands (Hardy 2014; 
Lee 2015a) and at least three locations in the Paracel Islands (Lee 2015b). Based mostly on 
satellite imagery and surveillance aircraft pictures, it is possible to have a superb and up to date 
description of the Chinese activities (see Lee 2016a; Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, 
2020). This could prove troublesome for setting date parameters for newspaper content analysis, 
but for the purposes of this research, the date the story was covered by multiple global 
newspapers will be used (Wong, 2014; Bureaucracy Today, 2014; Hardy, Atkinson, and Hurley 
2014; Blanchard, 2014).  
Data analysis 
War Journalism as the Salient Frame 
 Following Yang and Heng’s (2018) examination of The Star publications, this research 
similarly examines Chinese newspapers’ coverage of established assertive events. Particularly, 
this research examines how the newspapers utilize war journalism to frame the official narrative 
to the domestic Chinese audience. Galtung (2003) first used the peace/war journalism model to 
cover the Gulf War, as a means to describe how journalists focus on asserting a zero-sum 
solution (58). Tehranian (2002) advocated for the method, calling peace journalism “a system of 
global media ethics”.  
War journalism is elite-oriented in its news sourcing practice, whereby leaders and elites 
are often given the privilege to define and interpret an event or issue in news stories. War 





a conflict, while neglecting the factors contributing to the problem. This mode of journalism 
plays up conflict as an arena where participants are grouped starkly into two opposing sides 
(‘them vs. us’). It advocates the fate of “our side”, and only exposes the untruths and perpetrators 
of atrocities of the “other side”. Meanwhile, the lies and cover-up attempts of “our side” will be 
supported (Tehranian, 2002).      
In contrast, peace journalism is a broader, fairer and more accurate way of framing 
stories, drawing on the insights of conflict analysis and transformation (Galtung and Fischer, 
2013). It is people-oriented in its news sourcing practice; whereby common people are reported 
as actors and sources of information in news stories. By taking an advocative and interpretative 
approach, peace journalists concentrate on stories that highlight peace initiatives, tone down 
ethnic and religious differences and prevent further conflict (Tehranian, 2002). Peace journalism 
also reveals the sufferings of all the parties within the conflict, while presenting the invisible 
effects of violence such as emotional trauma and damage to social structure (Terzis, 2002; Lynch 
& Galtung, 2010). In addition, it also exposes lies, cover-up attempts and culprits on all sides 
(Tehranian, 2002). 
Lynch and McGoldrick (2007) defined peace journalism as an approach undertaken by 
editors and reporters in making choices about what to report and how to report in order to 
encourage non-violent responses to conflicts. However, scholars (e.g. Iggers, 1998; Loyn, 2007) 
criticized that it is against journalistic principle of objectivity because it expects self-conscious 
intervention by journalists. Scholars (Lynch and McGoldrick, 2007; Seow and Maslog, (2005) 
found that war/peace journalism is supported theoretically by the framing theory. Entman (1993, 
p. 52) defined framing as the process “to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make 





definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item 
described”. In addition, Lynch and McGoldrick (2007, p. 258) stated that framing refers to the 
“construct of a communication – its language, visual and messengers – and the way it signals to 
the listener or observer how to interpret and classify new information”. It was also mentioned 
that framing means “how messages are encoded with meaning so that they can be efficiently 


















Table 4.1: Results for Indicators of War Journalism in Four Chinese Newspapers (Valence) 
Indicators of War Journalism Percentage (n=99) 
Elite-Oriented 26.26 
Differences-oriented 67.68 
Focuses on here and now 32.32 
Dichotomizes the good and bad 47.47 
Two-party orientation 60.61 
Partisan 60.61 
Zero-sum orientation 36.36 
Uses victimizing/demonizing/emotive language 50.51 




















Table 4.2: Results for Indicators of Peace Journalism in Four Chinese Newspapers (Valence) 
Indicators of Peace Journalism Percentage (n=99) 
People-Oriented 1.01 
Reports the areas of agreement 4.04 
Reports causes and consequences 29.29 
Avoids labeling of good guys and bad guys 13.13 
Multiparty orientation 25.25 
Nonpartisan 3.03 


















Indicators of war journalism were decided based on the eight corresponding indicators 
outlined in Table 4.1. Each of the 99 articles used in this study were carefully analyzed in order 
to identify the presence of features prevalent in one or more of these indicators. In other words, 
each article was coded for the eight indicators. Articles that highlighted the individual leaders 
involved in the event the article reported on fell into the “elite oriented” category. “Differences 
oriented” and “Dichotomizes the good and bad” are similar in that they both consider differences 
in perspectives; however, “Differences oriented” articles emphasize the negative effects of the 
author’s perspective. “Focuses on here and now” and “Zero-sum orientation” both consider the 
event reported relative to the larger situation; however, “Focus on here and now” specifically 
omits broader consequences. “Two-party orientation” is also quite similar to “partisan”; both 
highlight differing perspectives, but “partisan” articles specifically side with one perspective 
over another.  Finally, “Uses victimizing/demonizing/emotive language” articles utilize language 
that portrays one perspective as the victim of the other.  
Among the selected data, examples of peace journalism were prevalent in China Daily 
over the other three agencies. China Daily was the most prevalent in reporting on these selected 
events, and Global Times generally produced the longest articles, following the expository model 
to present a more objective stance. The most prevalent indicators (60%+) recorded among all of 
the newspapers were: “Differences oriented”, “Two-party orientation”, and “Partisan”. An article 
with “differences oriented” sentiment would include language such as: “If the Vietnamese party 
stubbornly persists in its act of man-made vessel collisions with China in China's waters, China 
might take some countermeasures based on domestic laws.” (Yang, 2014) “Two-party 
orientation” sentiments may include language similar to: “A Chinese oil rig starting its normal 





forcible and illegal harassments from Vietnamese vessels, although Vietnam has no legal basis to 
back up its disruptive and dangerous activities.” (Wu, 2014) Partisan articles included sentiments 
such as: “Hanoi should return to its long-held recognition that the Xisha and Nansha islands are 
China's territories.” (Wu, 2014). It is worth noting that a single news article can include multiple 
indicators or war journalism, as can individual excerpts from an article. In other words, a single 
sentence could potentially represent multiple indicators for a single article. 
 Indicators of peace journalism, outlined in Table 4.2, were also examined. “People-
oriented” articles emphasize the affect that the reported event has on groups of people, whether 
citizens of effected areas, or national citizenry at large. “Reports the area of agreement” and 
“Avoids labeling of good guys and bad guys” both use language that emphasize similarities, but 
the latter specifically avoids righteousness or a preferred perspective. “Reports causes and 
consequences”, “Win-win” and “Multiparty orientation” both consider the reported event as it 
relates to the larger situation, but the latter two types specifically identify multiple outcomes or 
solutions to the reported disputes or problems. “Win-win” articles also report on multiple 
potential solutions to the problem. “Nonpartisan” and “Avoids victimizing/demonizing/emotive 
language” generally both follow an objective reporting style, and do not pit perspectives against 
each other, nor identify a “winner” or “loser” in disputes or problems.  
Among the same selected data, peace journalism was significantly less observed. The 
most prevalent indicators of peace journalism (25%+) were “multiparty orientation” and “reports 
causes and consequences”. An article that includes sentiments of multiparty orientation may 
include language similar to: “According to the provisions of the Convention, state parties shall 
settle any dispute between them by peaceful means according to the UN Charter, and when a 





through negotiations or other peaceful means.” (Jin, 2014). Articles with sentiments of “reports 
causes and consequences” may include rhetoric such as: If China is able to provide this 
[peaceful] reassurance, this would go a long way in reconciling existing differences over the 
SCS, especially with Vietnam and the Philippines” (Ho & Supriyanto, 2012). It is worth noting 
that indicators of peace journalism do not necessarily represent objective reporting, rather solely 
the presence of journalism framing that is “broader, fairer, and more accurate”, as it inherently 


















Table 4.3: Average Date of Publication Following Five Assertive Events (Visibility) 
Event Key word search Date range of 
results 
Average Date of 
Publication 
Cable Cutting,  
May 26, 2011-2012 
Vietnam and cable 
and ship 
2011-2013 5/24/2012  
(363 days after) 
Scarborough Shoal,  
Apr-Jun 2012 
Scarborough shoal 2012-2016 1/12/2014 
(~800 days after) 





(~575 days after) 
CCPC Oil Rig,  
May 2014 




(~140 days after) 
Land Reclamation,  
2014- 
land reclamation and 
South China Sea and 
dispute 
2015-2017 12/10/2015 
(~575 days after) 





                                                             






After careful analysis of 99 newspaper articles of the above five events, certain framing 
patterns were identified. Table 4.3 correlates the date of the event with the average date of 
newspaper publication following the event. The average length of time between assertive events 
and publication is 490 days. Broad key word searches were utilized in order to ensure a breadth 
of articles that reported on the intended event. Articles that included one or more of the key 
words within the search were selected, except for those that only mentioned the key words 
without reporting on the intended event. The “Date range of results” column reveals the date 
range, but is only descriptive. The search itself actually included any article between 2011-2016. 
The data range column was necessary because the events took place within multiple ranges of 
the larger “assertive time period”.   
 Manaheim (1994) identifies visibility of coverage as one of the three aspects of news 
framing analysis (the others being valence and frame genres). Visibility refers to the amount of 
coverage and the prominence level of an event covered in the news (Manaheim, 1994). Galtung 
(2003) contends that proper monitoring of peace journalism should include quality, quantity, and 
the extent to which it reaches the reader (p.179). The latter of these three data points is addressed 
through visibility for the purposes of this research. Regarding visibility following the certain 
assertive incidents, CCP media may have a pattern in [lack of] coverage. Chubb (2018) notes 
that following the 2009 USNS Impeccable incident, there was no television coverage, nor MFA 
press conferences that even mention the event took place for more than 20 days following the 
event (167).  
Particular to this analysis, newspaper visibility highlights the careful consideration that 
state media takes in formulating the official narrative. As the Chinese domestic audience is the 





support of the assertive events. In short, they don’t have to report right away. There is little 
outside influence or available information, meaning newspapers are not advantaged to publish 
stories immediately after the event. Table 4.3 shows clear indications of state media withholding 
stories regarding assertive events, though there is evidence of some newspapers publishing 
sooner than the average. It can be concluded that this delay in available information contributes 
to the creation and alignment of official narratives, likely to maintain popular favor of assertive 



















Chapter 5: Outlook and Implications in 
South China Sea 
 
Addressing Expected Findings 
1. Increased domestic intellectual constraints affect adaptation of foreign policy (Zhao, 1997).  
 Multiple scholars have noted the relationship between the specialized development of 
nationalism in China with the push to a more assertive foreign policies (Hughes, 2006; Shirk, 
2008; Amir, 2014). “China’s extensive sovereignty claims derive not from legal and historical 
claims, but from the nationalist desires that have increased greatly over the past few decades.” 
(Amir, 2014, p. 3). Shen (2007) asserts that the proliferation of nationalist expression “will 
potentially become a stabilizing force for China’s external relations” (p. 199). Rasmussen (2015) 
finds that nationalistic responses typically accompany military action (p. 5). Miller (2013) 
explores the concept of rising power sentiments of “being wronged by the empire”, as it relates 
to its frame in the domestic narrative. It is key to distinguish the unique position the CCP holds 
regarding the overwhelming control of domestic access to information. This total control ensures 
that the narrative it formulates through state media is the only information that the domestic base 
has access to in forming opinions.   
 In a study of the effects of Chinese Nationalism on foreign policy, Duan (2017) 
reconsiders the popular narratives that Chinese nationalism fuels external assertiveness. 
Specifically, with four points: Firstly, Chinese nationalism is not simply an elite instrument, but 
has deeply political, historical, cultural and external origins. Secondly, without a benchmark for 





imprecise and only intuitively plausible. The normative and empirical analysis reveals a simply 
fact that not all Chinese are nationalists, and some dislike nationalism, especially extreme 
nationalism. Thirdly, even though nationalists’ voices online and in media are challenging 
Beijing’s monopoly of power in framing foreign policies, the CCP still keeps nationalism in 
check: ‘If we still have little agreement over what Chinese nationalism is, it is next to impossible 
to use such a contested object to explain any particular foreign policy outcome’ (Carlson, 2009, 
p. 26). Lastly, it is unclear how influential nationalism is in foreign-policy arenas owing to the 
concept’s vagueness and fallacies in the reasoning (pp. 899-900). 
 In response to Duan’s (2017) concerns, this research challenges these findings. First, for 
the purposes of this study, whether Chinese nationalism is elite is not relevant. It is evident that 
Chinese nationalism is founded in deeply rooted historic contexts, but there is nonetheless no 
question of its existence. Next, the plausibility of the rise of Chinese nationalism, as a 
comparison to other periods is evident in the timeframe selected for this study, 2011-2016. This 
period saw unprecedented examples of assertive foreign policies in the SCS, as evidenced in 
Table 4.3. This narrow window alone represents a change to Chinese foreign policy, a change 
made possible by the tight grip on domestic access to information. Third, Carlson’s (2009) 
concerns regarding the Chinese definition of nationalism do not inherently prevent analysis on its 
effects. In fact, we have a better understanding of its deep roots in Chinese politics and culture 
because of the assertion. Finally, the newspaper content analysis conducted in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 
evidences the heavy weight that Beijing assigns to nationalist rhetoric.  
2. Realism best explains foreign policy aggressiveness.  
The relationship between newly assertive foreign policies (2011-2016) and media 





to balance regional power in China’s favor. However, it is worth noting that a specific variant of 
realism was found as a better explanation for these newly assertive events. Neoclassical realism 
addresses the domestic factors contributing to assertive foreign policies, while still retaining the 
essence of realist framework. In other words, neoclassical realism better accounts for the 
variables observed in this case. In this sense, it can be reasonably applied to similar cases with 
domestic constraints.  
This research has demonstrated an increased assertive foreign policy, specific to the SCS, 
starting in 2011. However, Johnston (2013) argues that assertiveness in China is neither new nor 
assertive. He identifies four main causal arguments for China’s new assertiveness in 2010: 
change in the distribution of power, rising Chinese nationalism, politics of leadership transition, 
and the power of the PLA (p. 35).  
Even if there had been a steep jump in nationalism in 2009, for it to have a causal effect 
one would have to demonstrate how and why in 2010 Chinese leaders decided to take 
rising nationalism into greater account when making foreign policy decisions. Proponents 
of the nationalism argument offer no theory about how popular sentiments are translated 
into foreign policy. The explanation makes an assumption about the hypersensitivity of 
the top leadership to nationalist public opinion for which there is almost no systematic 
evidence as yet. In a political system where there are no electoral costs to ignoring public 
opinion, it is unclear why China’s authoritarian leaders would care much about public 
views. Nor is it clear that China’s top leaders would want public opinion to matter on 
strategically important questions—they prefer maneuverability, not constraint. (Johnston, 
2013, p. 37) 
 
Multiple scholars contend that Beijing will become more cooperative as it increases 
relative power and becomes more integrate into the global system (Friedberg, 2005; Christensen, 
2006). In fact, Scobell and Harold, (2013) have dubbed this explanation as “premature 
triumphalism” (112). This explanation for assertiveness is a response to the 2008 recession, 
which represented a shift in world power. The theory is that China began acting far more 





Alternatively, the assertive actions can also be explained as a defensive action taken as a 
response to U.S. moves in the region. Specifically, US actions to reinforce its commitment to the 
Asia-Pacific (FON operations, UNCLOS, and other ally commitments) played to China’s 
underlying feelings of weakness and vulnerability. In this sense, Beijing’s “assertive” actions are 
better described as reactions, as Scobell and Harold (2013) named, “reactive insecurity” (112).   
 Alternatively, my research supports the claim that China’s actions are offensive by 
nature. The war journalism framing of assertive events signals a calculated, strategic effort to 
manipulate domestic opinion. As this is what Beijing relies on for legitimacy, further assertive 
foreign policy can be reasonably expected to follow. What’s more, China’s disputes in the SCS 
are not challenges to U.S. territory. This fact alone suggests that it cannot be inherently 
defensive. In fact, China’s recent economic development and military advances have elevated 
China’s status a global superpower (Brands & Sullivan, 2020). Because the SCS disputes are 
between China and relatively smaller countries (both geographically and in terms of soft power), 
China is able to continue its assertive foreign policies in the region without any real recourse. 
This scenario perfectly describes the realist model. Ratha (2019) offers that though China’s 
assertiveness may not be new, but it is newly overt: “In front of cameras, the Chinese are 
friendly and favorably disposed but underneath, they try to divide the South Asian countries by 
putting huge pressure on them” (10). 
Outside of competing state governments, another challenge that the CCP faces in its 
maritime disputes comes from international organizations. Legitimate challenges to international 
law and international norms from both ASEAN and the UN present a threat to China’s 
favorability in the international community. But, more importantly to the CCP, these challenges 





citizenry (Tsang, 2019), it cannot afford to lose favor with its domestic base, especially regarding 
of national pride and perceived international ranking. Nye (2011) observes that, even though 
economic hardships (2008 recession), the CCP was able to project a strong power assessment 
among the Chinese people. This has likely contributed to the more assertive foreign policy shift 
since 2009 (Nye, 2011). 
 In a study of Chinese IR scholars’ attitudes to international relations, Feng and He (2014) 
found that Chinese assertiveness is driven by a reaction to U.S. policies (14). The author 
contends that Chinese leaders are more likely to choose assertive policies as a response, which is 
independent of China’s rise in power (Feng & He, 2014, p. 14). In fact, Ross (2012) interprets 
the U.S. pivot to China as explicitly targeting China’s growth, development, and influence in the 
region (70-82). However, these analyses do not account for the relationship between media 
framing and newly assertive foreign policies. Because the U.S., China’s only relative power 
competition, is practicing only FON exercises (inherently non-offensive), and has not taken sides 
on territorial disputes, Chinese actions cannot be considered “reactive” or “defensive”.   
Relative to the region, the U.S. presence in the SCS is the glaring world superpower that 
presents a real challenge to the Chinese power balance. U.S. freedom of navigation maneuvers, 
strictly following UNCLOS rulings, along with key allies and basing in the area, make up the 
largest military threat that China faces in the region. However, China still has a long way to go to 
catch up to the U.S. regarding military, economic, and other soft-power resources (Nye, 2011). 
Even economically, the U.S. far surpasses that of China, and far from posing any real challenge 
to the U.S. (Nye, 2011). Following the realist model, U.S. presence in the SCS is the only factor 





3. China frames newspaper content in a way that positively reflects its zero-sum solution to SCS 
disputes. The framing of nationally sensitive issues is strictly controlled, as the CCP sends 
notices to all the newsrooms, gives direction on framing, and orders reprint articles from party 
mouthpieces (Kuang, 2014). Kuang and Wei (2018) find that the autonomy of the news 
organizations in non-democracies, such as China, to frame political issues largely depends on the 
geographic relevance of the issue due to the scope of the control exerted by the propaganda 
authorities.  
The data analysis of this thesis highlights how China utilizes its overwhelming control of 
available information to maintain positive popular sentiment regarding its assertive foreign 
policies. Particularly, the CCP’s stronghold over available newspaper outlets has proved to be 
one of the predominant ways in which it upholds this popular sentiment. The extensive use of the 
war journalism frame, as evidenced in Table 4.1, underlines the method by which the CCP 
defines and interprets assertive events in the SCS. War journalism is inherently a subjective 
method of reporting, yet another example of the role that information control plays in rallying 
support otherwise questionable CCP policies. 
 The presence of war journalism indicators within Table 4.1 further evidence China’s war 
focus in media production. This media frame is particularly alarming, given its inherent goal of 
polarization and escalation (Galtung, 2003, p. 179). Though alarming, it is not surprising, as 
Chinese legitimacy and justification for assertive policies relies on the support of its domestic 
base. Alternatively, peace journalism “stands for truth as opposed to propaganda and lies” 
(Galtung, 2002, p.179), which was evidenced in a relatively significantly lower number of 







The framework for this thesis research was modeled on Fong and Heng’s analysis of the 
SCS dispute through the perspective of a Malaysian newspaper’s framing strategies. The study 
found that Malaysian officials often highlighted to other ASEAN states their preferred solution 
(e.g. action vs. non-action) (31). At the same time, Kreuzer (2016) found that Philippine 
newspapers were simultaneously attempting the opposite, by highlighting Chinese assertiveness 
to its readers (239-276). This underlines the importance of understanding how state media 
controls fit into the larger picture of narrative formation. However, it can be concluded that 
external factors will have a relatively low impact on China’s domestic audience, as there is 
virtually no alternative information available.  Further research should also be conducted to 
measure the effectiveness of Chinese information control. A survey of regular readers, rather 
than Chinese IR scholars, may be more influential on domestic audience response. This study 
demonstrates the role that Chinese newspapers take in formulating available information, but the 
effect frames have on domestic opinion may offer more utility in prescribing theoretic 
explanations 
We must also consider similar dispute cases in order to better understand how they fit 
into Chinese core interests and policy goals. For example, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands have been 
disputed between China and Japan since the 1970s. In 2012, the Japanese government purchased 
three of the Senkaku Islands from private citizens. Subsequently, the Japanese Coast Guard 
recorded a dramatic increase in the number of Chinese vessels into the contiguous zone and 
territorial seas of the Senkaku Islands (Japanese MFA, 2020). Though these cases do not solidify 
which of the 5 core interests island disputes fall under, it does highlight the importance these 





also be considered a core interest as it relates to national security and economic development. 
Though there is little evidence of overt Chinese assertiveness regarding Korea, Xinchun (2010) 
argues that “the stability and development of the Korean peninsula directly relate to China’s core 
interests” (Xinchun, 2010).  
Finally, further research would be served well to examine the distinction between 
war/peace journalism among both democracies and authoritarian states. Addressing the presence 
of war journalism in democracies, and what separates them from authoritarian states, may serve 
to apply to a wider, global security dilemma. Alternatively, research conducted on the level of 
information control compared to the effectiveness of media framing would be useful; identifying 
authoritarian states that do not have a presence of war journalism may uncover alternative 
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